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SUMMARY 
More conventional analyses of EU accession suggest that the Central and 
East European countries have successfully completed a lengthy negotiation 
process and won the ultimate prize – EU membership. The analysis pre-
sented in this paper is more critical of this view. It focuses in particular on 
some of the more problematic features of the final EU membership agree-
ment, as well as the potential for future change from within the New 
Europe.  
Focusing in particular on bargaining outcomes with respect to the CAP 
and the Structural and Cohesion Funds, the EU accession process has led to 
an agreement that is fundamentally slanted in favour of the Old Member 
States. While the New Member States can claim marginal gains from this 
process – they do receive some CAP and Structural and Cohesion Fund 
payments – the “discrimination gap” is large and significant. Moreover, the 
imbalance in the distribution of resources is likely to have a market distort-
ing effect on the fortunes of the New and Old Member States. Weighing 
these points against the many costs of the accession, this paper questions 
whether the overall balance for the New Member States is positive or nega-
tive. 
The final section of the paper asks whether the imbalance in the dis-
tribution of EU resources can be overcome now that the New Member 
States are officially in the EU. Given the relative power of states within the 
EU decision-making framework, this paper argues that the large member 
states tend to dominate the decision-making process. Reform proposals made 
within the context of the new Constitutional Treaty do little to resolve this 
problem. Thus it is unlikely that the New Member States will be able to 
make substantial progress in resolving this imbalance in the near future (the 
chances are greater with the Structural and Cohesion Funds, much smaller 
with the CAP). 
This paper provides strong support for more traditional intergovern-
mentalist arguments about what drives decision making within the European 
Union. Moreover, it suggests that even with EU membership in the New 
Europe, the basic contours of the decision made at the December 2002 Co-
penhagen Summit are likely to continue to shape future EU policy debates. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
What drives enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union is a topic of great debate 
and is comparatively under-theorized. 
This fact is surprising given the degree 
of long-term membership growth in the 
EU. Beginning in 1957 as a geographi-
cally tight-knit group of six countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg), the EU 
has now progressively expanded to a 
group of 25 countries and will likely 
reach 27 member states in 2007. Further 
applicant countries are standing in the 
wings. Turkey, several of the former 
Yugoslavian states (apart from Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia 
and Macedonia), Albania, some of the 
remaining Russian satellite states (the 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) will ei-
ther begin negotiations shortly, have been 
encouraged to apply or are considering 
future membership bids.1 
                                                 
* This is a revised version of a paper presented 
at the April 2004 meetings of the Midwestern 
Political Science Association and the September 
2004 meetings of the American Political Science 
Association. I would like to thank the Institute 
for World Economics (IWE) of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences for graciously assisting me 
in my research and for allowing me to work at 
their institute in the summer of 2003 and 2004. 
The many thoughtful discussions I have had with 
researchers at the IWE and others in Budapest 
have profoundly influenced my thoughts on 
European integration. Significant portions of this 
paper were written, data collected and interviews 
conducted during that time. I would also like to 
thank Kálmán Dezséri, Bill Ferguson, Dóra Husz, 
András Inotai, Wayne Moyer, Jack Mutti, Miklós 
Somai, Milada Anna Vachudova and participants 
at the above mentioned conferences for helpful 
comments. Finally, I would like to thank Grinnell 
College for its gracious funding of summer re-
search in Hungary and Lukas Vrba for invalu-
able research assistance. All errors are of course 
my own. 
1 Croatia was scheduled to begin EU accession 
negotiations in March 2005 and Turkey is sched-
uled to begin in October 2005.  
A close examination of the final 
terms of the EU membership agreement 
toward Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
and the bargaining process by which it 
was decided helps to illustrate the typi-
cally intergovernmental character of the 
accession process. While some have sug-
gested that Enlargement and the decision 
of Western states to accept the Central 
and East European countries (CEEC’s) has 
been effectively driven by the constraints 
of collective identity and social norms – 
i.e. by a sense of ‘community values’2 – 
this paper will argue that a more tradi-
tional intergovernmental model is better 
suited to explaining the Enlargement 
process and the final terms of the 
agreement. More recent intergovernmen-
tal approaches insisting on the impor-
tance of national interests provide a 
more realistic assessment of the final im-
pact of these agreements.3 However, even 
current intergovernmental accounts un-
derestimate the benefits of EU enlarge-
ment to Western states and overestimate 
the benefits to New Member States 
(NMS’s). These accounts likewise underes-
timate the costs to the NMS’s.  
This paper concludes that the de-
tails of the final agreement of Enlarge-
ment of the European Union document 
are an intense struggle to preserve and 
safeguard the interests of the Old Mem-
ber States (OMS’s) and chronicle a string 
of dramatic concessions on the part of 
the NMS’s. Forced primarily by bargain-
ing asymmetries across the Old Member 
and Applicant States, by a bilateral ne-
gotiation process – and in return for 
negligible gains – the NMS’s have ac-
cepted significant costs. Bluntly put, the 
ability of OMS’s to design and manage 
the process of EU enlarge-
ment/membership has led to a less than 
ideal outcome for the NMS’s. Given their 
relative lack of bargaining power, com-
petition with other applicant states, and 
                                                 
2 See in particular Sedelmeier (2001), Schimmelf-
ennig (2001), and Fierke and Wiener (1999). 
3 See in particular Moravcsik and Vachudova 
(2003). 
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the threat of being excluded from the 
final agreement, they have accepted a 
less than optimal agreement. As govern-
ment negotiators repeatedly emphasize,4 
the threat of exclusion and the hope of 
being able to influence the EU decision-
making process from within motivated 
these states to accept an otherwise un-
satisfactory agreement. 
This paper will proceed in the fol-
lowing manner. First I will discuss the 
theoretical literature on Enlargement. 
Second I will describe the nature of the 
bargaining asymmetries influencing the 
association and membership negotiations 
with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
Third, I will discuss the final terms of 
the membership agreement and illustrate 
how the interests of the CEEC’s have 
been marginalized. Fourth, I will discuss 
how the Association and the final mem-
bership agreements have been carefully 
crafted to protect the interests of the 
OMS’s, placing the burden of economic 
and political adjustment on the candidate 
states. Fifth, I will discuss the ensuing 
problem of the rational pursuit of EU 
membership for the candidate countries 
and the potential for the CEEC’s to right 
the imbalance. The final section con-
cludes. 
1) EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 
ENLARGEMENT AND THE 
MISSING COUNTERFACTUAL? 
Attempts to fit EU enlargement into the 
traditional mold of European integration 
                                                 
4 This paper is based, in part, on a series of 
interviews completed in the summer of 2003 in 
Hungary and to a more limited extent in the 
Czech Republic. These interviews were with high-
level government officials across a range of dif-
ferent government ministries and with direct per-
sonal involvement in membership negotiations. 
theory are of recent vintage.5 Neo-
functional, social constructivist and inter-
governmental approaches appear to pro-
vide the most compelling accounts.6 Neo-
functionalists typically point to the role 
of interest groups, transnational actors 
and supranational institutions in the de-
velopment of European policy-making 
and institutional structure.7 In this 
model, European integration is driven by 
spillover. Transnational actors drive inte-
gration forward through their recognition 
of common interests and values that gain 
optimal expression in a supranational 
framework. Initial integration in individ-
ual policy areas drives actors to pursue 
integration in additional policy areas due 
either to linkages across policy areas or 
to the recognition of the advantages of 
supranational-level policy making. Supra-
national institutions facilitate this process 
through their detachment from state-level 
interests and their cultural socialization 
to European ideals. States take a back-
seat to transnational and supranational 
actors who hammer out cooperative, 
community-enhancing solutions. There is 
little room in this approach for differen-
tial gains across states or for states to 
pursue material interests and exploit 
relative bargaining power. Where policy 
integration occurs it is typically thought 
to be welfare enhancing for all, i.e. to 
                                                 
5 For early and important attempts to theorize 
enlargement see Redmond and Rosenthal (1998), 
Fierke and Wiener (1999), Mattli (1999), Sedel-
meier (2001). 
6 Although recent neo-Gramscian approaches 
(Holman, 2001; Bieler, 2003; Bohle, 2005) to the 
enlargement deserve attention, these are not dis-
cussed herein. 
7 For recent examples of this approach see Mat-
tli (1999), Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz (1997), 
Cowles (1995), Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991), and 
Sandholtz and Zysman (1989). Mattli (1999), for 
example, suggests that the process of enlarge-
ment is “demand-driven” by states that see eco-
nomic integration as a means of reversing the 
downward decline in economic performance. The 
interests of OMS’s are less important in this 
process, suggesting that integration is driven by 
spillover-like effects that push non-member states 
to opt for a supranational decision-making 
framework and a set of supranational institu-
tional arrangements to guarantee potentially 
greater levels of future economic success. 
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upgrade the common interest. As such, 
the neo-functionalist approach is not able 
to explain the shape of either the initial 
Association Agreement or the final Acces-
sion Treaty. 
Social constructivism, premised on 
“the impact of norms and ideas on the 
construction of identities and behav-
iour”,8 falls prey to the same weakness. 
Authors writing in this framework argue 
that European integration or the enlarge-
ment itself cannot be understood without 
reference to the norms and ideas that 
build identities and guide behaviour. 
Thus, the willingness of some Western 
states to accept potential losses resulting 
from the Eastern enlargement is ex-
plained by a sense of special responsibil-
ity,9 or by a sense of community values, 
identity and rhetorical entrapment.10 
Schimmelfennig (2001) argues that the 
Old EU Member States were above all 
persuaded to accept the Eastern 
enlargement as a result of a sense of 
community values. Having made promises 
to the CEEC’s and having accepted other 
European states, these countries were 
then able to pressure the EU to exercise 
fair treatment and open its doors to 
them as well. However, this approach 
likewise seems unable to explain the 
shape of the final Accession Treaty. 
Intergovernmentalists, on the other 
hand, point to the role of the state (and 
potentially to the role of groups within 
states). European integration occurs when 
the interests of states converge around 
common policy goals, or when states are 
able to exploit bargaining power vis-à-vis 
other states and grant side-payments 
(usually in the form of financial conces-
sions) or opt-out agreements in order to 
maintain support for controversial or 
unfavourable policies.11 The role of 
                                                 
8 Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener (1999: p. 
532). 
9 Sedelmeier (2001: p. 33). 
10 Schimmelfennig (2001: pp. 72–76). 
11 Moravcsik (1999, 1997, and 1991) provides 
perhaps the best example of this approach. A 
more recent paper on the EU enlargement like-
Europe-minded politicians and bureau-
crats is seen as secondary to that of 
state actors and the more intergovern-
mental, state-dominated European-level 
institutions (Moravcsik, 1999). State-level 
actors set the basic institutional and pol-
icy-making parameters of European inte-
gration. Moreover, states typically will 
not jeopardize sovereignty and will struc-
ture European integration so as not to 
threaten issues of central importance to 
individual states. Weaker states, however, 
may be required to accept some loss of 
sovereignty in order to achieve other 
goals. This model predicts differential 
gains from European integration, based 
on the ability of states to exploit their 
relative bargaining power. As such, this 
approach is better suited to explaining 
the contours of the final Accession 
Treaty. 
While this analysis is strongly inter-
governmental in character and bears 
strong resemblances to the approach and 
occasionally structure of Moravcsik and 
Vachudova (2003), it differs from their 
and other accounts in important respects. 
First, due to the emphasis on CEE inter-
ests in integration, the enlargement inter-
ests of the OMS’s are frequently under-
theorized and poorly understood. Many 
authors underestimate the gains to the 
West, while overestimating the potential 
gains for CEE.12 Central and East Euro-
pean (CEE) markets are quickly passed 
off as small and insignificant for West-
ern Europe13 – leading to the suggestion 
that the Eastern Enlargement represents a 
goodwill gesture from the West and 
leaving one to conclude that community 
values remain the sole operative explana-
tion. 
Second, authors frequently over-
emphasize the EU’s positive influence 
while failing to consider the contours of 
Western interests. Thus, considerable 
                                                                          
wise adopts this approach (Moravcsik and Va-
chudova, 2003). 
12 While Moravcsik and Vachudova mention 
some of these points, this analysis goes further. 
13 See for example Schimmelfennig (2001: p. 54). 
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emphasis is placed on the optimal nature 
of the policy solutions EU institutions and 
policies provide without analyzing their 
content or their degree of compatibility 
with CEE interests. Assumptions of opti-
mality regarding the adoption of ‘inde-
pendent civil services, reformed judiciar-
ies, oversight of financial markets and 
blocked bailouts of uncompetitive firms’14 
appear to drive the assertion that these 
changes serve CEE interests. The defini-
tion of CEE interests in this regard is 
problematic. The intergovernmental ap-
proach typically defines “state interests” 
in terms of the policy interests of states 
(or groups within states), not in terms of 
idealized models of institutional structure 
or legislative content.15  
EU methods of institutional organi-
zation and policy orientation frequently 
do not provide ideal models and/or are 
not always in the best interests of 
CEEC’s. Not uncommonly, the institutions 
and policies imposed by the EU result 
instead in the potential diversion of re-
sources and/or act to constrain the pol-
icy-latitude of the NMS’s.16 In providing 
such an all-encompassing definition of 
interests, the intergovernmental literature 
in particular seemingly spills over into 
the neo-functionalist terrain of promoting 
the welfare effects of belonging to a 
community based on the elaboration of 
optimal supranational policy solutions. 
The more typically intergovernmental ter-
rain of the “interests” of states, lowest 
common denominator bargaining, power 
asymmetries, threats of exclusion and 
side payments gets lost in the confusion 
of “ideal or optimal institutional struc-
tures” with “interests”. 
                                                 
14 Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003: p. 47). 
15 This type of problem is present to varying 
degrees in intergovernmental accounts of the 
enlargement. See for example Vachudova (2002) 
and Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003). 
16 For a discussion of the case of EU environ-
mental policy, see Ellison (2004). For a discussion 
of economic development strategies, competition 
policy and state aids, see Ellison (2005). See also 
Tupy (2003). 
Such assumptions amount to some-
thing like a missing counterfactual in 
discussions of the Eastern enlargement. 
The broad assertion that significant bene-
fits will emerge from EU membership or 
that the institutions adopted indeed rep-
resent optimal solutions is rarely put to 
the test. My approach herein attempts to 
illuminate the “interests” that lie behind 
the transplantation (or imposition) of EU 
institutions, policies and practices in CEE. 
EU environmental policy provides a sim-
ple example. While many argue that EU 
environmental policy will radically im-
prove the quality of the environment in 
CEE, Western interests are clearly sup-
ported by the creation of a “level play-
ing field” and the ability to sell environ-
mental technology to CEE. Moreover, 
western firms were strong proponents of 
the requirement to adopt EU environ-
mental policies and to create a “level 
playing field” (Ellison, 2000). In this 
sense, seemingly “ideal” policies are suf-
fused with Western interests in discrete 
but important ways. 
Finally, current analyses ignore the 
ability of Western actors to structure the 
accession process in ways that shift the 
principal burden of adjustment from the 
OMS’s to the acceding countries while 
the OMS’s reap most of the benefits. As 
argued in this paper, the outcome of the 
final membership agreement successfully 
achieves this goal. Presumably this was 
possible due to the unusual degree of 
bargaining power characterizing the ac-
cession process with the NMS’s. Admit-
tedly, there is a strong history of 
enlargement negotiations that involve 
“tough deals,”17 – significant concessions 
that derive from power asymmetries 
across states. However, the case of the 
Eastern enlargement provides a poten-
tially unique case.  
                                                 
17 The language here is from Ruano (2003), who 
compares the Spanish experience to that of the 
CEEC’s in negotiations related to the CAP. Mo-
ravcsik and Vachudova likewise discuss previous 
enlargement negotiations and the role of power 
asymmetries (2003: pp. 44–46). 
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As suggested by the core intergov-
ernmentalist concept of asymmetrical in-
terdependence, the interest of the CEEC’s 
in EU membership should exceed the 
willingness of the Old Members to grant 
it. In order to explain this willingness to 
accept concessions, asymmetrical interde-
pendence requires that CEEC’s at least 
perceive greater tangible benefits to 
membership than to remaining outside 
the European Club. Both of these argu-
ments appear to be true of the Eastern 
enlargement. Yet, the degree to which 
Western negotiators have been able to 
whittle down the terms of the final 
membership agreement and to lock-in 
gains for Western Member states sug-
gests that Western negotiators were sig-
nificantly more powerful in these nego-
tiations than in previous rounds of 
enlargement. 
The ability of the Western states to 
extract such significant concessions is 
due to several basic features of the 
enlargement process. On the one hand, 
significantly lower levels of economic de-
velopment in CEE placed these states at 
a much higher level of asymmetrical in-
terdependence than previous accession 
states. On the other hand, the negotia-
tion process was characterized by signifi-
cant asymmetries in bargaining power 
further reinforced by the degree of 
competition between candidate countries 
and their inability to establish a more 
cooperative strategy to bargaining with 
the EU. Threats of exclusion likewise 
played a role. Finally – and despite the 
fact that there are significant problems 
with this view discussed below – CEE 
negotiators frequently perceived an ad-
vantage to being inside the EU and in-
fluencing the policy-making process from 
within (where they will have voting 
power and where the bargaining power 
asymmetries will not be as great), than 
to remaining outside and virtually unable 
to influence policy-making in their largest 
export market. 
Given the potentially negative im-
pact of these asymmetries, the more per-
plexing question then becomes why the 
CEEC’s ultimately agreed to the final out-
come. In this context, in addition to 
perceived economic gains,18 it is difficult 
not to point to some of the more intan-
gible, abstract and symbolic gains of EU 
membership and their potential impor-
tance for citizens. Rightly or wrongly, 
membership is frequently seen as a 
guarantor of democracy and due proc-
ess19 and of market principles. EU mem-
bership likewise guarantees – at least in 
the more distant future – the free 
movement of peoples across European 
space. In this regard, EU membership 
also promises freedom of choice with 
regard to place of residence and ulti-
mately citizenship. Given the Communist 
legacy, such future mobility must appear 
as no small reward. In this respect, in-
terests in EU membership are presumably 
not entirely a function of “economic” 
interests. 
2) BARGAINING ASYMMETRIES 
Bargaining over EU membership has been 
dominated by power asymmetries across 
the negotiating countries. The most obvi-
ous bargaining asymmetry is based on 
the lack of real voting power over the 
final terms of the EU membership 
agreement. The CEE right to make pro-
posals (or raise objections), and to reject 
the final terms of the agreement, define 
the parameters of their bargaining 
power. However, one possible outcome of 
rejecting the final agreement might have 
                                                 
18 As will be discussed below, the evidence pro-
vided by Ellison and Hussain (2003) does not 
support the more conventional view that eco-
nomic gains are a likely outcome of EU member-
ship. 
19 Kovách (2000) and Lynch (2000) both imply 
in different ways that EU membership provides a 
form of protection against the ability of national 
governments to successfully exploit domestic 
power relationships.  
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been to indefinitely postpone or even be 
excluded from EU membership. The 
CEEC’s had no power to vote along with 
EU member states on the actual terms of 
the agreement. Second, each of the 
CEEC’s bargained bilaterally with the 
European Commission, further weakening 
these states and placing them in the 
awkward position of competing against 
each other to be included in the first 
round of NMS’s. 
On the EU side, there were several 
voting hurdles that the decision-making 
process had to overcome. The European 
Council and thus each of the member 
state heads of government exercised a 
veto over the enlargement process. The 
CoM (Council of Ministers) likewise had 
to approve the final decision (but given 
initial approval by the European Council, 
rejection from the CoM was unlikely). 
After the decision by the European 
Council and the CoM, however, since the 
EP and the parliament of each individual 
member state likewise had the right to 
veto the final enlargement decision, the 
approval process involved another 16 po-
tential veto points (Grabbe, 2002: p. 4). 
Moreover, the failure of any one state to 
approve the final agreement could poten-
tially have placed the entire enlargement 
process in jeopardy.  
As a consequence, the positions of 
individual member states mattered sig-
nificantly with respect to the terms of 
the final agreement. The interests of 
France, for example, weighed heavily on 
the final terms of the agreement on the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), while 
the interests of Spain, Portugal, Greece 
and Ireland weighed heavily on the re-
form of Structural and Cohesion Funds 
(SCF’s). The interests of Germany and 
Austria, on the other hand, had a strong 
influence on positions related to the free 
movement of labour. And finally, EU 
member states, industry and labour had 
a strong influence both on the require-
ment of adopting all elements of the ac-
quis communautaires (the existing body 
of EU legislation), and in particular on 
the creation of a “level playing field” 
reflecting the Western status quo. 
Although bargaining occurred on a 
bilateral basis, the CEEC’s would pre-
sumably have been far more powerful 
negotiating partners had they been suc-
cessful at coordinating their bargaining 
strategies. The candidate states did at 
various times attempt to work together 
and place more pressure on the Euro-
pean Union, but such efforts typically 
collapsed. Once one candidate state had 
signed an agreement on a specific point, 
all other states were inclined to follow. 
The often cited regatta principle20 of EU 
membership negotiation weakened the 
ability of the CEEC’s to exercise leverage. 
Faced with opposition to individual bar-
gaining points from the EU-side, the 
candidate states were unable to rely on 
the support of fellow candidate states. 
The pressure of competition between the 
applicant states thus weakened them fur-
ther vis-à-vis the EU. 
Finally, while any of the candidate 
states could have rejected the final 
agreement, this most likely would have 
jeopardized membership. Any country 
unwilling to accept the terms of the 
enlargement would have had to forgo EU 
membership for the current round and 
hope the EU would permit a second 
round. While certainly possible, there 
was no guarantee the EU would consider 
a second round of negotiation. Thus the 
candidate states were under significant 
pressure to accept the terms of the 
agreement concluded at the December 
2002 Copenhagen Summit. This had the 
effect of pressuring candidate states to 
accept the terms as they were and to 
                                                 
20 The “regatta principle” was chosen at the EU’s 
Helsinki Summit in December 1999, in part at 
the behest of the European Parliament. This 
method essentially made it possible for any state 
to complete the negotiations for EU membership 
ahead of – and without being held back by – 
other states. The logical consequence of this pro-
cedure was that all candidate states competed 
with each other to be the first states to become 
EU members. 
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hope for better terms once they had 
achieved membership. 
Concepts of a “war of attrition”, 
“conditionality”, or “hierarchical steer-
ing”21 suggest the CEEC’s were strongly 
pressured into accepting institutional and 
regulatory arrangements for which a 
stable domestic consensus was not always 
present. Moreover, while the CEEC’s had 
significant leeway to structure domestic 
arrangements in areas where the EU ac-
quis have little impact such as in the 
case of health care reform (see Jacoby, 
forthcoming), or the structuring of priva-
tization programs, for the most part, 
they were required to adopt the EU leg-
islative framework lock, stock and bar-
rel, without significant adaptation to do-
mestic needs and interests. The most ne-
gotiators were able to gain from the ne-
gotiation process were transitional peri-
ods to ease the cost and potentially the 
social impact of adopting EU law. While 
the greatest amount of bargaining leeway 
may have been present in negotiations 
over the EU’s Common Agricultural and 
Regional Policy frameworks – to be dis-
cussed in greater detail below – the real 
beneficiaries of this leeway appear to be 
the OMS’s. 
Negotiators frequently noted the 
lack of bargaining leeway, suggesting 
there was little margin for manoeuvre. 
Moreover, as negotiators frequently 
noted, attempts to coordinate bargaining 
with other candidate states largely failed. 
In practice, once the Commission had 
succeeded in gaining agreement on a 
particular chapter of the acquis, this 
agreement tended to fix the terms for 
other states, leaving little bargaining 
room. Despite attempts to coordinate 
                                                 
21 Brücker et al. view the negotiation process as 
a “war of attrition” (Brücker, Schröder and 
Weise, 2004). Börzel et al., on the other hand, 
emphasize the role of conditionality and note that 
the European Commission imposed this condition-
ality in a large number of bargaining venues, 
explicitly linking progress on institutional and 
legal reform to future membership. Thus these 
authors emphasize the importance of what they 
call “hierarchical steering” (see for example Bör-
zel, Guttenbrunner and Seper, 2005). 
common positions among the candidate 
states, all of these attempts broke down 
or were undercut by individual states 
concluding separate deals on specific 
chapters. Moreover, the EU was not in-
clined to reach different agreements with 
each candidate state. If the EU had con-
cluded different agreements with each of 
the candidate states, this ultimately 
would have led to repeated attempts on 
the part of some states to re-open and 
re-negotiate these agreements (and this 
did occur in some cases). All in all, 
Eastern negotiators frequently lamented 
the inability of the candidate states to 
successfully coordinate their bargaining 
strategies. 
On the EU side of the negotiating 
table, the range of choices available to 
the OMS’s appears like an unlimited 
smorgasbord from which they could in-
discriminately pick and choose protective 
and cost-reducing measures, from the 
agreement on CAP funding, the retention 
of SCF’s for the OMS’s, restrictions on 
the free movement of labour, and limita-
tions on the use of state aids in CEE 
even during the accession process. As the 
number of items chosen increases, the 
enlargement becomes progressively more 
palatable to the old EU member states 
and less and less so to the candidate 
states. Moreover, many of these choices 
deviate from existing EU practice, not to 
mention from the legal and regulatory 
framework of the acquis communau-
taires. The remainder of this paper will 
address these points in some detail. 
3) THE TERMS OF THE 
AGREEMENT 
The EU membership contract exhibits 
many concessions made to individual 
countries and interest groups in the 
European Union and few concessions 
made to individual countries in CEE. This 
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overview of the terms of the agreement 
illustrates the degree to which Central 
and East European negotiators were hin-
dered by bargaining asymmetries and 
unable to achieve important goals. 
Among the most important terms of the 
agreement include decisions relating to 
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), the EU’s SCF’s, the decision relat-
ing to the EU’s Environmental regulations 
(due to the great cost this implies for 
NMS’s), and issues related to access to 
EU markets and the overall potential for 
Central and East European competitive-
ness. The following discussion will ad-
dress each of these points in turn. 
EU expenditures on the 
NMS’s in 2004 totalled 11.8 bil-
lion Euros, out of a total budg-
etary expenditure of 112.2 billion 
Euros.22 In other terms, ap-
proximately 10.5% of the EU 
budget was spent on that 16.8% 
of the EU population most in 
need of financial support. More-
over, the EU receives half of this 
sum back from the NMS’s in the 
form of membership contribu-
tions (approx. 5 billion Euros). 
As Grabbe (2002) notes, over 
the period 2004–2006, the EU 
will spend approximately 40.8 
billion Euros on the NMS’s, but 
receives 15 billion Euros back in 
membership contributions. 
For 2004, the CAP and the 
SCF’s comprised approximately 
70% of the total EU budget. Of 
this sum, the Enlargement coun-
tries (including Cyprus and 
Malta) received about 4.4% of 
CAP payments (compared to 
95.6% for Old EU Member 
States) and 21.8% of the SCF’s 
payments (compared to 78.2% 
for the Old EU Member States). 
In 2005, the NMS’s will receive 
                                                 
22 These figures that follow are based on the 
European Commissions budgetary statements for 
2004 and 2005 and the Financial Framework for 
enlargement, 2004–2006. 
7.5% of EU CAP expenditures – reflect-
ing the inclusion of direct payments to 
farmers as of 2005 – and will receive 
16.3% of total EU SCF expenditures. 
However, the NMS’s – due to the EU’s 
co-financing requirements and the budg-
etary constraints currently facing the 
CEEC’s – may only be able to make use 
of a smaller share than they are eligible 
for. Thus, net EU expenditures may be 
significantly lower.23 Again, these sums 
represent a small share of overall EU 
expenditure. Moreover, the share of ag-
ricultural production in the overall econ-
omy in the CEEC’s is far more significant 
than in Western Europe. 
Given the uproar over the size of 
potential EU expenditures on CEE, one 
would expect the final amounts to be 
                                                 
23 See for example Grabbe (2001: p. 1). 
Table 1
EU Expenditures on the New Member States as a 
Share of EU and German GDP and National Government 
Expenditures, 2004–2006 (%) 
 
Total EU Expenditures on the New Member States 
 2004 2005 2006 
As Share of EU GDP 0.12 0.14 0.15 
As Share of German GDP 0.51 0.62 0.69 
As Share of EU 15 National 
Government Expenditures 0.23 0.28 0.30 
As Share of German Govt Expd. 1.04 1.23 1.36 
Net EU Expenditures on the New Member States 
 2004 2005 2006 
As Share of EU GDP 0.05 0.09 0.10 
As Share of German GDP 0.23 0.42 0.47 
As Share of EU 15 National 
Government Expenditures 0.10 0.19 0.21 
As Share of German Govt Expd. 0.46 0.83 0.93 
Source: Based on own calculations from GDP and Govern-
ment Expenditure data from the online New Cronos Eurostat 
data 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/reference/displ
ay.do?screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=EU_general_statistic
s&depth=1&language=en). GDP figures for 2004-2006 were 
estimated by Eurostat. Estimates of national government ex-
penditure figures for 2004-2006 are based on own calcula-
tions of average growth in total government spending based 
on the available New Cronos Eurostat data. Data on EU ex-
penditure on the New Member States is taken from the 
European Commission’s Financial Framework statement: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/-
copenhagen_package/webtablesEN.pdf. 
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large. Table 1 provides a perspective 
from which to judge the magnitude of 
the total sums the EU will spend on CEE 
over the period 2004–2006. Seen as a 
share of EU or German GDP, or as a 
share of total EU member state or Ger-
man government expenditure, the sums 
ultimately seem small, rising above 1% 
only as a share of total German gov-
ernment expenditures. Net EU expendi-
tures (accounting for NMS contributions 
to the EU budget) all remain well below 
1% of these comparative benchmark fig-
ures. 
3.1. The CAP 
The terms of the final CAP decision rep-
resent perhaps the most egregious case 
of East-West discrimination and the most 
obvious case of bargaining asymmetries. 
In the first year, the CEEC’s will only be 
eligible to receive 25% of the direct CAP 
payments other EU member state farmers 
receive under the same plan. The 
amount is to be increased on an annual 
basis by 5% after entry into the EU – 
bringing the CEEC’s up to 100% by 
2013. While this amount is certainly bet-
ter than the initial 0% payments offered 
by the EU, the final CAP agreement ul-
timately reflects a tremendous imbalance 
between Western and Central and East 
European interests. 
Several countries immediately lob-
bied for the right to both “top-up” their 
direct payments by 30% annually,24 as 
well as for the right to use 20% of the 
                                                 
24 CEEC governments are permitted to independ-
ently top-up direct payments, but within specific 
limits (on average by an additional 30% of the 
total direct CAP payments made to western 
farmers). In cases where CEEC subsidies have 
previously been higher than this amount, CEEC 
governments have retained the right to make 
larger direct payments. But direct payments can-
not exceed 100% of the EU-15 level. Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovenia have all 
received the right to make higher payments 
(European Commission, 2002?). 
agricultural regional development funds 
for additional direct payments to farm-
ers. As Grabbe points out – in the case 
of Poland – polish farmers might well 
have attempted to scuttle the deal with-
out this package (Grabbe, 2002: p. 3). 
Hungary likewise rapidly passed a par-
liamentary resolution guaranteeing direct 
payments would be topped up by an 
additional 30%. In effect, this clause 
functions as a “co-financing” arrange-
ment, even though no West European 
countries are required to engage in co-
financing arrangements in agriculture.25 
Second, as Grabbe (2002) notes, some of 
the funds transferred to direct payments 
might be better spent on economic 
restructuring or Regional policy co-
financing requirements. 
While the enlargement countries 
will receive more than twice the amount 
of support in SCF’s as CAP support, 
some authors have expressed concern 
that some of these monies will be di-
verted back into agricultural support 
and away from the potentially more im-
portant element of economic restructur-
ing. Grabbe, for example, notes that Po-
land was able to gain a lump-sum pay-
ment from the final negotiations, a part 
of which could be used for increasing 
Poland’s direct payments to farmers. At 
the same time, however, of the 9.8 bil-
lion Euros designated for CAP payments 
for the Enlargement countries over the 
period 2004–2006, 5.1 billion Euros will 
be used for “rural development” associ-
ated with the farming sector. Thus a 
larger share of the EU CAP funds will 
be directed to regional development (ap-
proximately 52%). This share is much 
larger than the customary distribution of 
funds in the OMS’s (approximately 
10.5%).26 This approach is congruous 
                                                 
25 Beyond CAP payments, the OMS’s typically 
have significant national-level agricultural subsi-
dies (see for example European Commission, 
2005: Table 3.4.10). However no national-level 
direct payments to farmers are permitted. 
26 These calculations are based on the “Financial 
Framework for Enlargement 2004–2006” (http://-
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with the concept of Modulation, the 
gradual shifting of EU CAP expenditure 
from direct payments to rural develop-
ment undertaken with the June 2003 ag-
ricultural reform and to some extent 
may be seen as a compensation for 
lower direct payments in the case of the 
CEEC’s.27  
The direct payments portion of the 
CAP plan remains significantly larger 
than the regional development segment 
only for the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary. Explaining this disparity raises 
some interesting questions. While the di-
rect payments portion of the CAP plan 
does not require any co-financing, co-
financing requirements are attached to 
CAP rural development measures. The 
average co-financing rate in the area of 
rural development is approximately 25% 
for the recipient state, 75% from the EU. 
Thus ultimately the greater emphasis on 
rural development measures in the 
NMS’s involves greater NMS budgetary 
responsibilities beyond the commitments 
of OMS’s. In this sense, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic have presumably 
gained more out of this section of the 
membership agreement than some of the 
other NMS’s.28 
Far more impressive is the way in 
which the EU has successfully locked-in 
the CAP agreement over the next reform 
period 2007–2013. Given that the phas-
ing in agreement is already written into 
the Accession Treaty for the entire pe-
riod 2004–2013 (and until 2015 in the 
case of Milk quotas), despite the fact of 
                                                                          
europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/-
copenhagen_package/webtablesEN.pdf). 
27 I am indebted here to discussions with Wayne 
Moyer. 
28 As Hungarian negotiators pointed out, they do 
not wish to see any shifting of transfers from 
the category of direct payments to rural devel-
opment. Rural development funds require co-
financing and farmers bear a greater share of 
the financial burden. The rural development 
funds also require an application process. Direct 
payments, on the other hand, do not require co-
financing, are not subject to an application proc-
ess, and are received directly by individual farm-
ers for immediate use. 
membership political leaders from the 
NMS’s are not likely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the Common Agricultural 
Policy for the next 8-10 years. This does 
not rule out marginal changes in the 
CAP. All of the CEEC’s now have full 
voting rights in the Agricultural Council. 
But it greatly limits the ability of these 
states to influence the larger contours of 
the CAP for a decade to come. Hungar-
ian negotiators, for example, noted that 
future efforts are focused on maintaining 
what they had already gained from the 
EU in the face of the June 2003 CAP 
reform and – perhaps more importantly 
– future rounds of WTO negotiations. 
Pushing for greater concessions on direct 
payments or the rural development share 
of this agreement was not typically per-
ceived as an option.29 
Justifications for the reduction of 
direct payments to 25% of Western 
payments reflect fears that 100% pay-
ments to CEEC farmers would bankrupt 
the EU.30 However, while CAP reform 
was necessary and budget cuts were dif-
ficult to achieve in the West, why CEE 
farmers should bear the burden of EU 
budget-cutting is not clear. Fears that 
price supports in CEE could lead to in-
flation and public discontent was a sec-
ond justification. Given however that 
prices in CEE have largely been western-
ized, this point carries little weight. And 
farmers like other citizens in CEE face 
rapidly rising costs. Fears that excessive 
CAP payments in CEE would lead to 
“market distortions” constitute a third 
argument. However, it is difficult to ar-
gue that the reverse logic is not true. It 
is not likely the case that higher CAP 
payments in the Western part of Europe 
and lower CAP payments in the Eastern 
                                                 
29 With respect to the sugar agreement in the 
Accession Treaty, the terms are being reduced by 
international disputes. The WTO ruled against 
the EU sugar regime in August 2004 in response 
to a dispute filed by Brazil, Australia and Thai-
land triggering further reforms of the accession 
agreement. 
30 Multiple EU documents are relevant here. See 
e.g. European Commission (2002b and 2002c). 
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part of Europe will have a market “neu-
tral” effect. Finally, the EU’s approval of 
national topping-up measures casts a 
rude irony over any of the arguments 
against additional payments to CEE farm-
ers.31 
Fears that high levels of direct 
payments could ultimately lead to a 
slowing down in the rate of restructur-
ing and to the creation of income dis-
parities in rural communities constitutes 
a fourth argument.32 Here again, how-
ever, there are considerable costs at-
tached to the adoption of the acquis in 
the agricultural sector, in particular re-
lated to veterinary care, hygiene, animal-
welfare, environmental protection and 
phytosanitary conditions. Moreover, there 
were no clear estimates of the compli-
ance costs imposed on individual farmers 
and very few transitional periods were 
awarded in the agricultural sector. 
Farmers were expected to be EU compli-
ant by May, 2004. Without accurate 
estimates of the costs farmers face in the 
NMS’s, the relative impact of direct 
payments on regional income disparities 
remains unclear. Moreover, the costs of 
restructuring agricultural production re-
main considerable and would be facili-
tated by higher CAP payments. 
That direct payments will lead to a 
slowing down in the rate of restructur-
ing is a dubious claim. For one, the en-
tire CAP regime has presumably led to a 
slowing down of the rate of economic 
restructuring in the EU, in particular to 
higher levels of agricultural production 
and lower levels of industrial production 
than are presumably optimal. More 
compellingly, the regime of price sup-
ports – in particular – has led to slower 
rates of economic restructuring in the 
EU and less so the gradual shift to di-
rect payments adopted with the 1992 
MacSharry reforms. By beginning to di-
vorce farm subsidies from the regime of 
                                                 
31 I am indebted here to discussions with Miklós 
Somai. 
32 European Commission (2003: p. 3). 
price supports, these reforms mitigate 
overproduction and market inefficiencies. 
In the long run, while direct payments 
may reduce the impact of market incen-
tives and reduce the need for market 
restructuring, direct payments also pro-
vide financial resources that can facilitate 
restructuring. 
The distribution of direct payment 
ceilings (e.g. for beef and cereals) and 
quotas (e.g. for milk production and 
sugar), however, is potentially the most 
troubling element of the final CAP 
agreement. For one, the reference peri-
ods used to define the direct payment 
ceilings and quotas for the NMS’s pre-
sented obvious complications. The EU in-
sisted on using 1995–1999 during which 
the economies of CEE were recovering 
from the economic crisis of 1991–1994.33 
The candidate countries argued that di-
rect payment ceilings and quotas based 
on these years underestimated potential 
or normal domestic production levels. 
The final direct payment ceilings and 
quotas, however, were not much higher 
than those based on the reference years 
preferred by the EU. 
For another, although the direct 
payment ceilings and quotas received by 
the NMS’s were often favourably re-
viewed – in particular those for milk, 
beef and cereals, since they were typi-
cally higher than production levels in the 
NMS’s – this analysis ignores a number 
of important factors. For one, NMS di-
rect payment ceilings and quotas are 
frequently much below those of the 
OMS’s. Per capita direct payment ceilings 
and quotas provide a very rough basis 
for comparison34 (see Table 2). On aver-
age, OMS’s have milk quotas that are
                                                 
33 Some argue that the depth of this crisis 
equaled the Great Depression. In some cases, 
CEEC output declined by as much as 30-40%. 
34 This methodology is flawed in that it ignores 
the concept of comparative advantage. Different 
geographic locations yield climates that are better 
suited to growing different types of agricultural 
products. The calculations here cannot correct 
for this fact. The law of averages may provide a 
marginal though insufficient correction. 
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Table 2 
CAP Direct Payments Ceilings and Quotas for Milk, Sugar, Cereals and Beef 
 
Country Milk Quota    2004-6 
Sugar Quota 
(A+B) 
Total Cereals 
DP Ceiling 
Beef National   
Envelope 
DP Ceiling (€) 
Per Capita Milk 
Quota (tons) 
Per Capita Sugar 
Quota (tons) 
Per Capita Cereals
DP Ceiling (tons)
Per Capita Beef 
National Envelope 
DP Ceiling (€) 
Cyprus 145,200   181709.2 308,900 0.22  0.27 0.46 
Czech Republic 2,682,143 454,862 9465111.6 8,776,017 0.26 0.04 0.92 0.85 
Estonia 624,483   870784.8 1,134,510 0.43  0.61 0.79 
Hungary 1,947,280 401,684 16497256.2 2,936,076 0.19 0.04 1.65 0.29 
Latvia 695,395 66,505 1108950 1,330,680 0.29 0.03 0.46 0.55 
Lithuania 1,646,939 103,010 3095909.1 4,942,267 0.45 0.03 0.84 1.34 
Malta 48,698   9221.3 63,700 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.16 
Poland 8,964,017 1,671,927 28364013 27,300,000 0.23 0.04 0.73 0.71 
Slovakia 1,013,316 207,432 4074019.18 4,500,535 0.19 0.04 0.75 0.83 
Slovenia 560,424 52,973 659651.17 2,964,780 0.28 0.03 0.33 1.49 
Average         0.27 0.03 0.66 0.75 
  average 2004-2006          
Greece 700,513 306,000 4733457 3,800,000 0.07 0.03 0.45 0.36 
Ireland 5,395,764 192,000 2100640 31,400,000 1.43 0.05 0.56 8.31 
Portugal 1,884,504 77,000 2962959 6,200,000 0.19 0.01 0.30 0.62 
Spain 6,116,950 974,000 3976190 33,100,000 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.84 
Austria 2,770,022 364,000 6339810 12,000,000 0.34 0.04 0.78 1.48 
Belgium 3,335,259 774,000 2986464 39,400,000 0.33 0.08 0.29 3.84 
Denmark 4,488,764 392,000 10533960 11,800,000 0.84 0.07 1.97 2.21 
Finland 2,425,038 141,000 4486620 6,200,000 0.47 0.03 0.87 1.20 
France 24,417,567 3,523,000 81426520 93,400,000 0.41 0.06 1.37 1.57 
Germany 28,073,802 3,174,000 57480696 88,400,000 0.34 0.04 0.70 1.08 
Italy 10,530,060 1,468,000 22624680 65,600,000 0.18 0.03 0.39 1.13 
Luxembourg 271,067   182328 3,400,000 0.61  0.41 7.71 
Netherlands 11,157,752 809,000 2907090 25,300,000 0.70 0.05 0.18 1.58 
Sweden 3,327,773 355,000 6982740 9,200,000 0.37 0.04 0.79 1.04 
UK 14,719,172 1,098,000 26004715 63,800,000 0.25 0.02 0.43 1.07 
Average         0.42 0.04 0.69 2.06 
Sources:  Quotas taken from the EU Accession Treaty, Commission Regulation No. 2316/1999, AGRA-Food East Europe (1/21/03), DG Agriculture data and popula-
tion data from the Eurostat Yearbook (2002). 
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about 1.7 times those in the NMS’s (0.45 
tons per person in the OMS’s compared 
to 0.27 tons per person in the NMS’s). 
Moreover, these quotas are fixed for the 
period 2004-2006 (and possibly through 
2015). While per capita sugar quotas 
and per capita direct payment ceilings 
for cereal production compare more fa-
vourably to those in Western Europe, 
this is not the case for the “beef enve-
lope”. Here, Western producers receive 
direct payments 2.75 times greater than 
those in CEE.35 
Setting direct payment ceilings and 
production quotas is significant for at 
least three reasons. First, they represent 
a second mechanism by which the OMS’s 
could reduce CAP payments to CEE (and 
preserve higher subsidies for Western 
states). Though CEE production and con-
sumption of agricultural goods is likely 
to increase as they become more devel-
oped and incomes rise, current direct 
payment ceilings and quotas set a ceiling 
above which it is politically difficult to 
rise in the future. This is especially true 
given the context of the June 2003 re-
form of the CAP.36 This reform sets out 
a procedure by which direct payments 
are annually reduced for the OMS’s. 
Thus, even if the NMS’s raise overall 
productivity, this is unlikely to precipitate 
adjustments in direct payment ceilings 
comparable to those obtained over time 
by the OMS’s. Current quota increases 
envisaged in the milk sector, for exam-
ple, amount to 1% per year for all states 
in 2007 –2008 (European Commission, 
2003). Second, this further reduces the 
share of financial support that might 
                                                 
35 Even with increases received by a few coun-
tries between the initial suggested beef envelope 
and the final figures noted above (the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovenia and Estonia 
– Hungary saw their initial allotment decline by 
approximately 17%), Central and East European 
allotments never came close to OMS direct pay-
ments. 
36 The January 2003 legislative proposal 
(COM(2003) 23 final) was finalized for the 
OMS’s in June 2003. This document does not 
finalize the terms of this reform for the NMS’s. 
otherwise be used for CEE agricultural 
restructuring. 
Third, these ceilings and quotas 
impose serious constraints on the re-
structuring of European economic space. 
While market integration ordinarily re-
sults in economic specialization, the CAP 
in general and the system of direct 
payment ceilings, quotas and fixed prices 
in particular, will likely prevent this 
from happening. Moreover, the enlarge-
ment CAP regime will have a differential 
impact on Old and New Member States. 
OMS’s will be able to retain their cur-
rent production levels in the agricultural 
sector, despite potential comparative ad-
vantages in some products in the NMS’s. 
Intervention prices have the advantage of 
both guaranteeing payment and higher 
subsidies for agricultural goods produced 
in the OMS’s and of reducing the poten-
tial competitiveness of CEE agricultural 
goods in the wider EU marketplace. Thus 
while market integration ordinarily pro-
motes comparative advantage, the fixing 
of direct payment ceilings, quotas and 
intervention prices for the NMS’s and 
OMS’s distorts market incentives and 
imposes market preserving features on 
the enlargement outcome in agriculture. 
Thus the NMS’s will likely face a limited 
market for agricultural goods in West-
ern Europe. 
Finally, the June 2003 reform’s 
complete decoupling of direct payments 
and production may ultimately have the 
effect of locking-in higher direct pay-
ments to OMS’s for the duration of the 
survival of the CAP. Since direct pay-
ments no longer depend on production, 
decoupling and modulation may ulti-
mately scuttle any mechanism for in-
creasing support to the NMS’s. The di-
rect payment ceilings and quota system – 
in combination with fixed intervention 
prices – potentially preserve Western ag-
ricultural market shares and provide 
fewer incentives for productivity im-
provements in the NMS’s. Increased pro-
duction is not likely to raise direct pay-
ments and fixed prices diminish the po-
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tential to engage in real competition with 
Western agricultural goods (at least for 
those goods that are regulated by the 
CAP). Thus locking-in the NMS’s at 
lower direct payment ceilings and quotas 
than those in effect for the Old EU 
Member States is likely to have a long-
term market distorting impact on the 
ability of the more agricultural NMS’s to 
benefit from market access in agricul-
ture.  
3.2. The SCF’s 
The December 1999 Berlin Summit estab-
lished 0.45% of EU GDP would be avail-
able for structural and cohesion meas-
ures. This sets an upper limit on 
what share of the EU budget can 
be spent on the overall package 
for the SCF’s and on the total 
amount available. In addition, since 
the Berlin Summit, the SCF alloca-
tions now include a ceiling of 4% 
of the GDP of the recipient coun-
try. The principle is the so-called 
absorption capacity of the candi-
date states. Given the budgetary 
constraints on the NMS’s and their 
lack of experience in administrat-
ing the SCF’s, the European Com-
mission has long assumed that the 
CEEC’s will only be able to engage 
in the required co-financing mar-
gins for SCF projects within spe-
cific limits. This ceiling thus limits 
the total amount of funds that 
countries can receive from the EU. 
 The final amounts made 
available to the CEEC’s for the pe-
riod 2004–2006, are well below 
the 4% of GDP limit set by the 
Berlin Summit (See Table 3). Only 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were 
allocated amounts close to or above the 
4% limit. Most of the CEEC’s received 
allocations far below the 4% level.  
Comparing the allocations of the NMS’s 
to those of the OMS’s, strong discrepan-
cies emerge in the distributional logic 
across these two groups. The old “cohe-
sion” countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain) will receive much higher per 
capita allocations for the period 2004–
2006. Portugal and Greece will receive 
more than 3 times as much funding as 
the average NMS (see Table 3). All of 
the old cohesion states will receive higher 
per capita allocations than any of the 
CEEC’s. The Baltic States seem to have 
fared better than any of the other 
NMS’s. However, Ireland – rapidly losing 
eligibility due to high rates of economic 
growth and convergence on the EU av-
erage per capita GDP – will receive far 
more funding per capita than the highest 
NMS recipient Latvia. 
According to CEEC government ne-
gotiators, the EU was not forthcoming 
about the formula used to arrive at the 
final distribution of SCF’s among the 
CEEC’s. Negotiators were only able to 
Table 3
Structural and Cohesion Funds 
(Per Capita and as Share of GDP) 
 
Country 
Structural 
and Cohesion 
Funds 
(Mill Euros)
 (2004-2006)
Structural 
and Cohesion 
Funds as 
Share of GDP 
Per Capita 
Structural 
and Cohesion 
Funds 
Cyprus 101 0.4% 150.52 
Czech Republic 2328 1.4% 226.64 
Estonia 618 3.7% 430.36 
Hungary 2847 1.9% 284.02 
Poland 11369 2.2% 294.16 
Slovenia 405 0.7% 203.62 
Latvia 1036 4.5% 428.63 
Lithuania 1366 3.7% 369.59 
Slovakia 1560 2.5% 288.84 
Malta 79 0.7% 202.56 
Averages: 2170.90 0.02 287.89 
Spain 23,163 1.3% 587.27 
Portugal 9,570 2.8% 957.15 
Greece 10,295 2.8% 976.45 
Ireland 1,632 0.5% 432.09 
Averages: 11164.82 0.02 738.24 
Source: European Commission, Eurostat Yearbook and 
Bruxinfo.hu. 
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indicate that the formula used by the EU 
depended on three primary factors: the 
level of per capita GDP, population, and 
the level of unemployment. Thumbnail 
regressions of the total SCF’s received by 
the NMS’s using these three variables 
and including the level of support for 
EU membership,37 suggest that these 
variables do a pretty good job of pre-
dicting the total amount of funding re-
ceived by each NMS. The model explains 
99% of the variance (see Table 4).38 
While such a high value may seem sur-
prising, recall the political difficulties 
                                                 
37 Carrubba (1997), suggests that the distribution 
of EU funds is influenced by the level of public 
support for the EU (where EU support is low, 
there are incentives to increase expenditure in 
order to maintain support). The statistical results 
generated above only support this thesis in 
Model II.  
likely to emerge from the differential 
treatment of applicant states. Population 
is the strongest predictor of total fund-
ing and is highly significant. Apart from 
population, per capita GDP begins to 
approach significance, suggesting that 
more developed countries receive lower 
levels of funding. While levels of unem-
ployment appear to have a strong posi-
tive impact on total funding, this vari-
able does not begin to approach ade-
quate levels of significance. Finally, total 
funding exhibits a positive but statisti-
cally insignificant relationship to support 
for EU membership. 
Comparing the logic for the distri-
bution of funds among the NMS’s to 
the allocation across the old “cohesion” 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain) yields surprising results. This is 
accomplished by taking the parameters 
from the regression equation estimated 
for the NMS’s and using these to pre-
dict the total value of SCF’s that the old 
cohesion countries would receive. For 
purposes of cross-country comparison, 
both predicted and actual values are 
expressed in per capita terms in the 
figure below (see Figure 1a). According 
to this calculation, Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain receive far more fund-
ing than they should have received us-
ing the logic applied to the NMS’s. Ob-
serving the ratio of actual to predicted 
funding for the cohesion countries, 
Spain receives about twice as much 
funding as one would expect, Portugal 
and Greece about 4 times as much, and 
Ireland approximately 11 times as much 
funding. The ratio of actual to pre-
dicted funding for the NMS’s, however, 
is very close to 1 in all cases except 
Cyprus.39 
 
                                                                          
38 The unit of analysis here is the individual 
country. Data permitting, the regional level 
would be more appropriate. 
39 Of all the NMS’s, Cyprus seems to have faired 
the best where the SCF’s are concerned. They 
received far more funding than the amount pre-
dicted by the logic applied to the remaining 
NMS’s.  
Table 4 
Structural and Cohesion Funding 
 
 
 
Model I 
Candidate 
Country 
Model 
Model II 
Member 
 State Model
Per Capita GDP -14.1 (-1.46) 
-105 
(-2.10) 
Population 0.0003 (28.4) 
.0001 
(2.43) 
Unemployment 5.99 (0.22) 
770 
(1.49) 
Support for EU 0.561 (0.06) 
212 
(2.41) 
 n  
   
10  
  
15  
 Adj. r2  
   
0.99  
  
0.67  
 
Sources: SCF’s data for the OMS’s was taken from 
the Regional Policy DG’s website 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/intro/regi
ons5_en.htm). For the NMS’s, SCF’s data was taken 
from the “Financial Framework for Enlargement 
2004-2006” 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk
/copenhagen_package/webtablesEN.pdf). Data on 
population GDP in current prices were taken from 
the Eurostat Yearbook (2001). Data on support for 
EU membership were taken from the Eurobarometer
(3/2003) and unemployment data was taken from 
the Eurostat Structural Indicators website. Finally, 
data on per capita GDP relative to the average of 
the European Union was taken from Bruxinfo 
(www.bruxinfo.hu). 
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 Inverting this analysis one 
can estimate the total SCF alloca-
tion the NMS’s should have re-
ceived based on the distributional 
logic applied in the EU. The same 
set of independent variables is 
used and a regression equation is 
estimated only on the OMS’s. The 
derived equation estimates a 
smaller share of the variance than 
above – only 67% compared to 
99% in the equation above (see 
Table 4 above). However, this is 
plausible due to the degree to 
which politics has presumably fil-
tered into the allocation of struc-
tural and cohesion funding over 
time, presumably contributing to 
the larger share of the residual. 
Based on these parameters, 
the NMS’s would have received 
far more financial support than is 
currently the case (see Figure 
1b).  Expressed in ratios, the 
NMS’s would have received 
between 2 and 80 times as 
much support. In this con-
text, it is easier to under-
stand the logic of the 4% of 
GDP threshold. This limit had 
a very decisive impact on the 
degree to which the NMS’s 
could benefit from the SCF’s 
and guaranteed significant 
and continued payments to 
the OMS’s. 
The fact that the NMS’s 
jumped into the middle of a 
budgetary period may like-
wise have created an artifi-
cial but effective way of lim-
iting expenditures. Since the 
overall amounts available for 
SCF measures were set with 
the Berlin Summit, the 
amounts distributed to the 10 
NMS’s were allocated within 
these limits. Although part of 
Figure 1a 
Actual and Predicted Per Capita Structural 
and Cohesion Funds 
(Based on Candidate Country Model) 
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Figure 1b
Actual and Predicted Per Capita Structural  
and Cohesion Funds 
(Based on EU Member State Model) 
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the budgetary period had essentially 
passed (states were expecting a possible 
membership in 2002 and thus would 
have been eligible for financial transfers 
from 2002–2006), the total amount of 
funding had to be divided across 10 
states (instead of 4-6 states) over a 
shorter time period (2004–2006). Thus, 
while the NMS’s received levels of fund-
ing only slightly lower than expected 
based on the conclusions of the Berlin 
Summit, the timing of the enlargement 
may have set additional limits on the 
bargaining power of individual states.40 
Whether the NMS’s will be able to 
influence bargaining on the next Finan-
cial Perspective that will decide the SCF 
allocations for the period 2007–2013 de-
pends not only on the relative bargaining 
power of these states (discussed below) 
but also on the timeframe within which 
the EU is likely to move toward comple-
tion of the actual proposal. A significant 
struggle is likely to ensue. As Richter 
(2003) points out, given that 0.45% of 
the EU budget will be allocated to the 
SCF’s, and given that the CEEC’s cannot 
receive monies above 4% of GDP, one 
can calculate how far these funds are 
likely to stretch across the NMS’s. Rich-
ter assumes that each of the NMS’s will 
receive the full 4% for which they are 
eligible and comes to the conclusion that 
80% of the funds will be exhausted with 
10 NMS’s. With 12 NMS’s (including 
Romania and Bulgaria) 97% of the funds 
will be exhausted. 
These figures – as Richter points 
out – do not include future distributions 
to the old “cohesion” countries, or to 
any of the other OMS’s. Those states 
and regions that will no longer be eligi-
ble for SCF’s as a result of the drop in 
                                                 
40 All summits can potentially lead to new ar-
rangements or to the amending of old arrange-
ments. And this did happen at the December 
2002 Copenhagen Summit. All of the candidate 
countries were able to bargain additional lump-
sum payments to ensure they would not be net 
contributors to the EU budget. However, these 
sums do not resolve any of the inequities noted 
above. 
the average EU per capita GDP – the 
so-called statistical effect – are likely to 
push for compensation for lost funding. 
There is already some precedent for this. 
Regions no longer eligible to receive 
SCF’s during the period 2000–2006 were 
allocated “transitional support” payments 
at the 1999 Berlin Summit to the tune 
off 11.142 billion Euros (Allen, 2000: p. 
258). 
Negotiators from the CEEC’s have 
insisted upon the principal of “equal 
treatment”. Whether or not they will be 
able to achieve this goal remains unclear. 
The EU is moving as rapidly as possible 
toward the completion of its proposal 
for the next Framework Agreement for 
the period 2007–2013. The total pro-
posed budgetary allocation for the SCF’s 
was published on February 10th, 2004 at 
least 3 months prior to the official date 
of entry into the European Union. While 
this agreement does not set the distribu-
tions for individual countries, it fixes the 
overall share of EU funding devoted to 
the SCF’s prior to the date of actual 
membership.41 The allocations represent 
only minor increases over previous 
amounts (see Table 5). A 10% increase 
as of 2007 (the year in which Bulgaria 
and Romania are scheduled to join), and 
by much smaller amounts in following 
years (presumably about equal to the 
rate of inflation). Expressed in per-capita 
terms however, the amounts remain al-
most constant, 0.26 Euros per person in 
2006, and 0.27 Euros per person in 
2007. From 2007 to 2013 per capita 
expenditures slowly rise to 0.32 Euros 
per person, though again inflation is 
likely to wipe out these gains. However, 
these amounts should be placed in the 
context of the European Commission’s 
Third Report on Economic and Social 
Cohesion. According to this report, with 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
the size of the EU population living be-
low 75% of the EU average will more 
                                                 
41 See “Building our Common Future: Financial 
and Political Outlook for the Enlarged Union 
2007–2013”, (COM(2004) 101 final). 
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than double from 73 to over 153 million 
(European Commission, 2004: pp. ix-x). 
Again the CEEC’s may be left with 
little bargaining room for almost the 
next decade (or until work begins on 
the following Framework Agreement). 
However, the final version of the Frame-
work Agreement will most likely be de-
cided at the December 2006 Summit. At 
this summit, the NMS’s will have full 
voting rights and may potentially have 
more significant voting powers. Given 
that multi-annual Framework Agreements 
are approved by unanimity – likewise 
the rule under the new Constitutional 
Treaty – this would give each of the 
NMS’s the right to veto unsatisfactory 
outcomes. However, each of the OMS’s 
likewise has a veto. This may ultimately 
mean that the NMS’s would not have 
significant voting power on this agree-
ment. 
 
3.3. The Direct Costs of 
EU Membership 
The direct costs of EU mem-
bership are still being calcu-
lated. Many of the CEEC’s 
did not have a very good 
idea of the total costs of full 
compliance with the aquis 
cmmunautaires. Even though 
the actual membership nego-
tiations were completed and 
the time for negotiating tran-
sitional periods had passed, 
in some areas general cost 
assessments were still being 
completed in 2003.42 While 
this is not true for all EU 
policy areas – several esti-
mates exist for environmental policy – 
even completed assessments may still 
yield surprises and unexpected costs fur-
ther down the line. 
Budgetary constraints on the NMS’s 
arising from EU membership are likely to 
be significant. Over the period 1997–
2003, the average annual budget deficit 
in these states was -3.7% of GDP (see 
Table 6). In June 2004, the European 
Commission noted that 6 or the 10 
NMS’s (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) 
had excessive budget deficits and urged 
them to bring their budgets into compli-
ance with the EU Stability Pact (Eurac-
tiv.com, June 25, 2004). Apart from Cy-
prus and Malta, the states with the 
                                                 
42 For example, in Hungary, work was being 
completed on cost assessments for the adoption 
of EU health and work safety regulations in the 
summer of 2003 with an expected completion 
date of fall, 2003. On the other hand, in the 
agricultural sector, according to officials at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, little was known about 
the potential costs of directives relating to veteri-
nary and phytosanitary conditions and animal 
welfare in the summer of 2003. Likewise, despite 
the fact that Hungary expected to complete the 
introduction of EU compatible legislation in fall 
2003, at that time very little had been done to 
estimate the full cost of liberalization in the tele-
communications sector. 
Table 5 
Proposed EU Expenditures on Structural and Cohesion 
Funds 2006-2013 
 
 Total      
Appropriations 
Percent 
Increase 
Estimated  
Population 
Per Capita 
Appropriations
2006 120,688,000  459,069,367 0.26 
2007 133,560,000 10.7 489,194,290 0.27 
2008 138,700,000 3.8 490,157,736 0.28 
2009 143,140,000 3.2 491,125,055 0.29 
2010 146,670,000 2.5 492,096,247 0.30 
2011 150,200,000 2.4 493,071,313 0.30 
2012 154,315,000 2.7 494,050,251 0.31 
2013 158,450,000 2.7 495,033,061 0.32 
Source: Own calculations based on Appropriations data from 
“Building Our Common Future” (COM(2004) 101 final: p. 29) 
and population data from Eurostat Online NewCronos data 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/reference/display.do
?screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=EU_general_statistics&depth=1
&language=en). 
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highest budget deficits in were the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland (-12.9%, -
5.9% and -4.1% respectively). While the 
level of public debt in the NMS’s is sub-
stantially higher, the total sums remain 
well in line with the Economic and 
Monetary Union’s (EMU) 60% of GDP 
convergence criterion. The EU average in 
2001 was twice as high as that in the 
NMS’s. The average public debt position 
of OMS’s at the time of their entry into 
EMU was significantly higher. 
The range of costs that the NMS’s 
are likely to face in the coming years is 
considerable. Of these, environmental 
compliance costs are likely to be among 
the most exorbitant. Continued costs re-
sult also from the ongoing process of 
legal harmonization, implementation and 
enforcement, as well as from the costs 
of complying with EU regulatory re-
quirements. Additional costs will arise in 
the agricultural sector – in particular 
with respect to veterinary matters, hy-
giene, animal-welfare, environmental fac-
tors, and phytosanitary conditions, as 
well as from “topping-up” EU direct 
payments. 
Many features of acquis adaptation 
involve high costs. In the transport sec-
tor, for example, one EU regulation re-
quires that NMS roads have a weight-
bearing capacity of 11.5 
tons, compared to the 
slightly lower limit in some 
CEEC’s. Hungarian roads – 
apart from those built since 
1989 – typically have a 
weight-bearing capacity of 
10 tons.43  Additional ex-
penditures will result from 
the continued building of 
highways for the Trans-
European Networks pro-
gram (TENS). The railway 
systems in all countries 
likewise require significant 
investments to make them 
conform to EU standards. 
While most NMS’s have 
received transition periods 
in sectors where the expected costs of 
compliance are high, the NMS’s must 
still finance the lion’s share of these 
costs out of state budgets. 
The environmental chapter of the 
EU membership agreement represents one 
of the most costly agreements. Estimates 
of the total cost of environmental protec-
tion have varied significantly. More re-
cent estimates have dropped by some 
50%, though many of the actual costs 
are still unknown. Table 7 provides data 
on the total estimated costs of compli-
ance as a share of GDP. Estonia is the 
most serious case, where cost estimates 
attain some 70.4% of 2001 GDP. This 
estimate is followed by Bulgaria with 
56.5%, and Romania with 49% of 2001 
GDP. Figures for a number of countries, 
in particular Slovenia, Lithuania and the 
Czech Republic, are less daunting. 
Based on an estimate of annual 
government expenditure (1% of GDP) 
and on annual growth rates of 3%, it 
would still take the Czech Republic some 
                                                 
43 New highways built in Hungary since the be-
ginning of the transition process have all incor-
porated the higher European standard and do 
not require reconstruction. The Czech Republic, 
on the other hand, does not have the same prob-
lem with its roads, though it still faces other 
problems connecting highways to the system of 
Trans-European Networks (TENS). 
Table 6 
Budget Deficit as Share of GDP 
(1997–2003) 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bulgaria -0.3 1.7 0.4 -0.5 0.2 -0.8 -0.1 
Cyprus   -4.9 -4.5 -2.4 -2.4 -4.6 -6.3 
Czech Republic -2.6 -4.5 -3.7 -4.5 -6.4 -6.4 -12.9
Estonia 2 -0.4 -4 -0.3 0.3 1.8 2.6 
Hungary -6.8 -8 -5.6 -3 -4.4 -9.3 -5.9
Lithuania -1.1 -3 -5.7 -2.6 -2.1 -1.4 -1.7
Latvia   -0.7 -5.3 -2.7 -1.6 -2.7 -1.8 
Malta -10.7 -10.8 -7.6 -6.5 -6.4 -5.7 -9.7
Poland -4 -2.1 -1.4 -1.8 -3.5 -3.6 -4.1 
Romania -4.5 -3.2 -4.5 -4.4 -3.5 -2 -2 
Slovenia   -2.2 -2.1 -3 -2.7 -1.9 -1.8 
Slovakia -5.5 -4.7 -6.4 -12.3 -6 -5.7 -3.6 
Source: Eurostat Structural Indicators 
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9-12 years to cover these estimated costs 
of compliance. For Estonia, Bulgaria and 
Romania, on the other hand, it will ob-
viously take much longer. Finally, little 
attention has been paid to the significant 
diversion of resources that will occur as 
a result of the requirement to fulfil these 
regulations. As Ellison (2004) illustrates, 
given the favourable environmental im-
provements in CEE since 1989, the de-
gree of urgency is questionable. 
Given the above estimates and the 
amount of time needed to cover these 
costs, the rate at which the CEEC’s are 
expected to achieve compliance with EU 
environmental regulations is quite rapid. 
As illustrated in Table 8, the latest point 
in time at which any of the NMS’s are 
expected to have successfully complied 
with individual regulations is in 2017 
(for Poland and the large combustion 
plant directive). Most transitional periods 
end quite early. A few transitional peri-
ods end in 2015 for isolated countries, 
in particular for compliance with air 
pollution from large combustion plants 
and with the treatment of urban waste-
water. All NMS’s requested more and 
longer transitional periods than the EU 
was willing to grant (see Table 8). Latvia 
(with 23 requests for transitional periods 
and 8 granted) and Poland (14 and 10 
respectively) made the largest number of 
requests. While presumably not all of 
transitional requests were justified, com-
pliance requirements will weigh heavily 
on both public and private expenditures 
and ultimately competitiveness.44  
Most of the CEEC’s likewise envi-
sion EMU membership in the not too 
distant future. Estonia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia, for example, envision EMU 
membership in January, 2007. Poland 
hopes to join by 2009, and Hungary 
and the Czech Republic are currently 
pursuing EMU membership by 2010.45 
The EU Accession Treaty obligates the 
NMS’s to become members of the EMU, 
though no specific dates are set. Thus,
                                                 
44 For a more detailed analysis of the costs and 
complications likely to arise as a result of EU 
accession, see Ellison (2004). 
45 All data has been taken from 
www.Euractiv.com (“Adopting the Euro in the 
NMS’s”, Feb. 11, 2005). However, future revisions 
of these dates are not unlikely. Hungary, for 
example, previously announced 2008 as its dead-
line for EMU membership. Due to Hungary’s 
current budget deficit problems, 2010 now ap-
pears a more likely date of entry.  
Table 7
Total Costs of Compliance as a Share of GDP and 
Total Number Years to Achieve Compliance 
 
 
GDP 
Billions of Euros 
(2001) 
Environmental   
Compliance Cost  
Estimates Billions  
of Euros 
Cost as Share of 
2001 GDP 
Number Years   
Required for    
Compliance 
Czech Republic 68.189 6.6-9.4 9.7-13.8% 9-12 
Estonia 6.257 4.406 70.4% 39 
Cyprus 10.205 1.086 10.6% 10 
Latvia 8.593 1.48-2.36 17.2-27.5% 15-21 
Lithuania 13.259 1.600 12.1% 11 
Hungary 57.873 4.12-10 7.1-17.3% 7-15 
Malta 4.349 0.130 3.0% 3 
Poland 207.126 22.1-42.8 10.7-20.7% 10-17 
Slovenia 21.746 2.430 11.2% 10 
Slovakia 23.322 4.809 20.6% 17 
Bulgaria 15.250 8.610 56.5% 34 
Romania 44.887 22.000 49.0% 31 
Source: The GDP data are from Eurostat’s website, compliance costs estimates from DANCEE (2001). I 
have based the calculations of the number of years required for compliance on the following assump-
tions: annual environmental expenditures of 1% of GDP and an average annual growth rate of 3%.
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Table 8 
Transitional Periods for Compliance with EU Environmental Regulations 
 
Sector/Directive Bulgaria Cyprus Czech    Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
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Emissions of VOC 
from storage of petrol 2010  2004    2007 2006   2009 2008 2010 2007 2005 2004 2009 2005 2010  2010 2007   
Sulphur content of 
certain liquid fuels 2010  2004 
1 year 
dero-
gation
      2004    2006  2009 2006     2004  
Limitation of Emissions 
of AIR QUALITY VOC 2012          
to be 
speci-
fied 
       2015  2010    
Incineration of haz-
ardous waste         2005 2005 2004          2006 2006   
PCB/PCT   2010        2004              
Waste                 2012        
Hazardous waste           2004      2012        
Packaging and pack-
aging waste 
2012  2005 2005 2005 2005   2005 2005 2015 2007 2010 2006
2006 
+ 
special 
provi-
sion 
2007 2007 2007 2010   2007 2007 2007 
Shipment of waste                 2012 2007       
Disposal of oil waste           2004      2005        
End-of life vehicles 
          
to be 
speci-
fied 
             
Incineration of waste                   2010      
Landfill of oil shale        2009                 
WASTE 
MANAGEMENT Landfill 
of waste 
2015          2015 2004 2015     2012 2017      
Treatment of urban 
waste water 2015  
to be 
speci-
fied 
2012 2010 2010 2010 2010 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2009 2009 2007 2015 2015 2022  2015 2015 2015 2015 
Protection of waters 
against pollution 
caused by nitrates 
from agricultural re-
sources 
    2005  2008    2010  2011    2010  2014  2008    
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Sector/Directive Bulgaria Cyprus Czech    Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
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Discharges of danger-
ous substances into 
aquatic environment 2011    
to be 
speci-
fied 
by 
1999
 2006  2009  2010    2009 2007
to be 
speci-
fied 
2007 2015  
to be 
speci-
fied 
2006   
Quality of bathing 
water 
          2008              
Quality of water in-
tended for human 
consumption 
    2006  2013 2013   2015 2015 2015  2006 2005   2022  2008    
Quality of surface 
water intended for the 
abstraction of drinking 
water 
                2010        
Ground water directive       2006  2007  2010              
WATER QUALITY 
Quality of fresh wa-
ters 
          2005              
Conservation of natu-
ral habitats and of 
wild fauna and flora 
    2005      2010  2010            
Conservation of wild 
birds     2005  2010    2010  2010  
special 
provi-
sion 
2008         
Integrated pollution 
prevention and control
2012  2004  2012    2007  2015 2010   2004  2010 2010 2015  2011 2011 2011 2011 
Air pollution from 
large combustion 
plants 
   
special 
provi-
sions
 2007  2015 2004 2004 2008   2015 2006 2005  2017 2012  2010 2007   
Substances that deplete 
the ozone layer               
Special 
provi-
sion 
 2006        
Storage of asbestos 
waste 
          2004 2004             
Health protect. of 
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this requirement represents a “soft” con-
straint. Nonetheless, it is clearly in the 
interest of the OMS’s to see that the 
CEEC’s are firmly integrated into the 
EMU framework as rapidly as possible. 
This would remove any potential for the 
NMS’s to use devaluations as a means of 
promoting exports and reducing the flow 
of imports.46 Moreover, it is clearly in 
the interest of Old Member State firms 
to eliminate currency fluctuations that 
disrupt vertical integration (or “interna-
tional production”) networks with CEE. 
It is less obvious why the NMS’s 
would rapidly pursue membership in 
EMU. For one, the 3% budget deficit 
threshold established by the convergence 
criteria and the Stability and Growth 
Pact represents a significant barrier 
given the high costs of compliance of EU 
membership. This goal is likely to gener-
ate considerable conflict between the 
compliance costs of EU directives on the 
one hand and demands that the CEEC 
governments provide financial support 
for economic restructuring on the other. 
As noted above, the EMU Stability Pact 
requirement already enables the Euro-
pean Commission to place pressure on 
the CEEC’s to reduce expenditures, fur-
ther heightening the degree of financial 
tension. On the other hand, economic 
competitiveness goals might suggest that 
a postponement of this date along with 
the ability to pursue more export-friendly 
exchange rates is more clearly in their 
interest.47 
                                                 
46 Granted, the ability of states to take advantage 
of this option may be constrained by the free 
mobility of capital, the potential for currency 
speculation and the relative dependence on im-
ports. But member state exporters expressed 
concerns that Central and East European gov-
ernments could use this tool to boost exports 
and disadvantage the import prospects of mem-
ber state goods. Currently China is perhaps most 
well known for its pursuit of such an export-
promoting strategy through its peg to the US 
dollar. Judging by the degree of US frustration 
with this policy and Chinese resistance to change, 
China has benefited from this arrangement. 
47 This point is controversial. Others suggest that 
EMU membership would strengthen weak capital 
markets, reduce interest rates and reinforce the 
Doubts persist about whether the 
NMS’s will be able to meet the transi-
tional deadlines specified in the Accession 
Treaty. Several government officials ex-
pressed doubts about this. For one, the 
costs are quite formidable and for an-
other CEE negotiators faced strong incen-
tives due to competition with other ap-
plicant states to keep requested deadlines 
as short as possible. Interviewees sug-
gested that compliance in the area of 
urban wastewater treatment and waste 
disposal, for example, is not likely even 
by the rather late transitional deadline of 
2015. 
4) WHO WINS AND WHO 
LOSES? 
The above evidence suggests the 
enlargement has been structured in such 
a way as to either enhance the competi-
tiveness of West European market struc-
ture or diminish the impact of market 
opening while virtually ignoring the con-
sequences for economic development in 
CEE. This is not only true with regard to 
the distortionary structure of EU CAP 
and SCF expenditure discussed above, 
but also with regard to Western interests 
in the establishment of a level playing 
field and the protection of sensitive sec-
tors discussed below. EU Member states 
and industry had a strong influence both 
on the requirement that CEEC’s adopt all 
elements of the acquis communautaires 
and on the creation of a “level playing 
field” based on the Western status quo.  
Many have suggested that the West 
will gain far less from the enlargement 
than CEE.48 One commonly used indica-
                                                                          
already high degree of trade integration (see for 
example De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2004). 
48 Schimmelfennig (2001) and to a lesser degree 
Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003) clearly suggest 
that the OMS’s have far less to gain from the 
enlargement than the NMS’s. 
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tor is the relative gains from trade for 
each region. Western Europe’s trade with 
CEE comprises a small share of total 
West European trade. While EU member 
state exports to this region have almost 
tripled since 1992 (from approximately 
5.4% of total trade in 1992 – the first 
year in which there are complete trade 
figures available for all of the CEE can-
didate states – to 14.6% in 2003),49 this 
number pales in comparison to the share 
of CEE trade with EU member states. 
The average share of CEEC world trade 
was 67.1% in 2003.50 Based on this sta-
tistic, the CEEC’s are often said to gain 
the most from membership in the Euro-
pean Union. 
There are, however at least two 
important caveats to this point. First, as 
Schimmelfennig notes, member states that 
share borders with CEE trade far more 
heavily with this region than other states. 
Germany for example is responsible for 
just less than half of EU exports toward 
CEE, Italy for over 16%, Austria for al-
most 9%, and France for over 7% 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001: p. 51). Thus par-
ticular Western states have very strong 
interests in cementing trading relations 
with CEE and diverting some CEEC trade 
from other parts of the world.51 
Second, a very significant share of 
CEE exports toward EU member states 
originates from foreign investment enter-
prises (FIE’s). The FIE share of manufac-
turing exports in 1996, was 73.9% in 
Hungary, 42% in the Czech Republic, 
                                                 
49 Data for 2003 has been calculated on the 
basis of figures from the online Eurostat Comext 
database 
(http://fd.comext.eurostat.cec.eu.int/xtweb/). Data 
for 1992 was calculated on the basis of data 
from the Eurostat Comext Trade database (Euro-
stat, 2003). The figures reported here exclude 
intra-EU exports from the total of world trade. 
Including intra-EU exports reduces the share of 
exports to the CEEC10 from 14.6% to 5.6% in 
2003 and from 5.4% to 2.1% in 1992. 
50 This figure is again calculated on the basis of 
data from the online Eurostat Comext database. 
51 The disruption of traditional trading ties be-
tween countries like Poland and the Ukraine has 
been a source of conflict and has led to signifi-
cant losses on both sides of the border. 
and 25.8% in Slovenia (Hunya, 2000: p. 
114). By 2001, these figures rose to 
87.9% for Hungary, 69.3% for the Czech 
Republic, and 36.8% for Slovenia (Hunya, 
2004: p. 15). The FIE share of 1996 
manufacturing production, was 61.4% in 
Hungary, 22.6% in the Czech Republic, 
21.6% in Slovakia and 19.6% in Slovenia 
(Hunya, 2000: p. 119). By 2001 this rose 
to 72.5% for Hungary, 53.3% for the 
Czech Republic and 29.3% for Slovenia 
(Hunya, 2004: p. 15). FDI in CEE is 
likewise associated with an increase in 
both employment and productivity in 
Western firms (Ekholm, 2003). Finally, 
OMS firms export a steadily increasing 
share to CEE. Eurostat’s Statistics in Fo-
cus (8/2001) designated the candidate 
states (including Cyprus, Malta and Tur-
key) as the second largest EU trading 
partner next to the US in the year 
2000. This region likewise represents the 
fastest growing EU export region next to 
China. Over the period 1990-2003, ex-
port growth to the new member and 
candidate states averaged 13.4% per year 
(16.9% per year for exports to China), 
well above average growth in extra-EU 
exports (7.4%). Such measures greatly 
increase the economic and political 
weight of the region for Western 
Europe. 
The original Association (or Europe) 
Agreements signed by each of the candi-
date states in the early 1990’s set the 
future terms of trade between the EU 
and the CEEC’s and were one of the 
first tools used to structure the accession 
process in the EU’s favour.52 While occa-
sionally seen as beneficial to the candi-
date states – these agreements did open 
up EU markets to some degree – they 
fell shy of being liberal trading ar-
rangements. They provided for the pro-
tection of EU “sensitive sectors” (coal, 
steel, textiles and clothing) over a transi-
tion period of approximately 5 years 
(this time period varied from sector to 
                                                 
52 For much of what follows in this section, I 
draw upon previous published work (Ellison, 
1999). 
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sector and from country to country). A 
somewhat longer transition period in 
these same economic sectors was granted 
to the CEE economies.53 EU agricultural 
and food-processing sectors were granted 
full protection. The CEEC’s had, however, 
pursued immediate liberalization in all 
economic sectors, including textiles, steel, 
and agricultural goods (Meisel, 1995: p. 
60). 
On the other hand, agricultural 
markets were opened up almost immedi-
ately by the Association Agreement on 
the CEE side. Thus EU agricultural ex-
ports to CEE greatly increased, while EU 
imports of CEE agricultural goods re-
mained more or less constant. This re-
mains one of the most uneven exchanges 
to date and is difficult to explain in the 
context of improving market access for 
CEE goods. Moreover, this was problem-
atic for the agricultural sectors of CEE. 
With the crash of the ruble in 1991, 
many of these countries lost their ability 
to export to Russian markets. Though 
CEE agricultural producers were search-
ing for new markets, they were unable 
to find them in Western Europe. 
The choice of strategies for the re-
moval of trade barriers was likewise 
problematic. CEE negotiators reportedly 
copied some of the requests of the EU 
states and attempted to protect the same 
economic sectors. From a traditional 
comparative advantage approach to in-
ternational trade, this strategy is difficult 
to understand. One would have expected 
the CEEC’s to protect those sectors that 
were most threatened by trade with the 
EU – in particular capital and skill-
intensive sectors – and to pursue open 
trade in sectors where they likely had a 
comparative advantage. Thus, one might 
have expected to see demands for 
greater protection in more “technologi-
cally advanced” sectors where EU pro-
ducers presumably had a strong advan-
tage.  
                                                 
53 For an interesting discussion of these negotia-
tions from a Central and East European perspec-
tive, see Meisel (1995). 
Where the CEE governments did 
impose protective barriers in more ad-
vanced sectors, this frequently protected 
EU producers in CEE. In this regard, 
CEE producers were poorly organized – 
producer or employer organizations were 
quite new due to the legacy of state 
ownership and the command economy 
and were typically unsuccessful at gain-
ing representation of their interests from 
CEE governments. Western producers, on 
the other hand, were well organized and 
accustomed to dealing with both EU offi-
cials and foreign governments. They were 
reportedly better prepared for specific 
negotiations and were able to provide 
CEE governments with arguments that 
withstood the objections of EU authorities. 
Moreover, Western firms possessed what 
the CEEC’s desperately wanted, capital 
and technology. The result was that ad-
ditional forms of market protection be-
yond the transitional periods noted above 
tended to benefit Western producers 
who had undertaken substantial invest-
ments in these countries.54 
Additional clauses in the Association 
Agreements likewise promoted Western 
firms at the expense of CEE interests. 
For one, protection of the EU’s sensitive 
sectors was porous in ways that bene-
fited Western producers. Outward proc-
essing trade (OPT) agreements were 
permitted when Western firms submitted 
formal applications to the European 
Commission. Thus trade in the sensitive 
sectors was permitted when beneficial to 
Western producers and was otherwise 
restricted (Ellison, 1999: pp. 267–8). For 
another, the Association Agreements in-
cluded clauses that restricted the use of 
state aids and granted the EU oversight 
rights to determine when such expendi-
tures should be allowed (Cremona, 
2003). The impact of this agreement was 
that attempts by CEEC’s to impose trade 
restrictions for competitive reasons were 
repeatedly rejected by EU authorities 
(Ellison, 1999: p. 266). Further, Western 
                                                 
54 See for example Nagy (1994). 
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producers and trade unions actively pro-
moted the creation of a “level playing 
field”. These organizations strongly advo-
cated the elimination of potentially mar-
ket distorting policies (such as state aids, 
competition policy, differences in envi-
ronmental regulation, or potential differ-
ences in health and safety in the work-
place and labour market protections).55 
Restrictions on the free movement 
of labour are further likely to benefit 
western labour. Economic analyses em-
ploying either conventional models or the 
tenets of the more recent endogenous 
growth and economic geography schools 
see the free movement of labour as one 
of the cornerstones of cross-country eco-
nomic convergence.56 In this regard, the 
2+3+2 regulation on the free movement 
of labour permitting states to restrict 
labour market access for up to 7 years 
is likely to have a significant impact both 
on the CEE rate of increase in the stan-
dard of living, as well as on their de-
gree of public satisfaction with EU mem-
bership. Again, in this context as well, 
the principal players were western trade 
union organizations – in particular in 
Germany and Austria.57 
Seen in the larger context of glob-
alization, economic competition and eco-
nomic restructuring – in particular as 
this relates to the interests of the West-
ern member states – the role and impor-
tance of Western interests in the 
enlargement and the terms of the final 
membership agreement are more fully 
comprehensible. The Eastern enlargement 
fits neatly not only into a strategy of 
market expansion, but also into a strat-
egy of controlling the evolution of mar-
kets and promoting OMS global competi-
tiveness. CEE trade with Western Europe 
                                                 
55 On EU social policy and environmental regula-
tions, see Ellison, 2001b: Ch. 5. On state aids 
and competition policy, see Ellison (2005).  
56 On more conventional models, see in particu-
lar Williamson (1997, 1996). On models that rely 
on economic geography and economies of scale, 
see Martin (2003). 
57 See for example Ellison (2001b: Ch. 5) and 
Bohle and Husz (2003). 
has expanded and some of the rewards 
of this trade will accrue to CEE citizens 
as well. Still, two points are worth con-
sidering. First, it is not clear that EU 
membership is necessary in order to 
benefit from trade and economic 
growth.58 And second, as suggested by 
the above analysis, the structure of the 
trade agreements favoured Western in-
terests. These agreements and the Acces-
sion Treaty itself defended Western in-
terests in establishing a “level playing 
field” based on the Western status quo 
and shifted the burden of adjustment 
onto CEE. The Association Agreements 
ultimately left industry, manufacturing 
and even the agricultural sector com-
pletely exposed to Western competition 
and technological know-how. In the long 
run, it is difficult to reconcile the mar-
ket distorting features of the CAP and 
SCF arrangements with the impact acces-
sion and EU membership has had on 
CEE economic development and competi-
tiveness. 
4.1. Resolving the Imbalance 
Many politicians and analysts suggest it 
is better to be inside and members of 
the European Union where states have 
voting rights and can influence the po-
litical process than to be outside and 
unable to impact the decision-making 
process. There is possibly some merit to 
this argument. Non-tariff barriers can 
easily be raised to discriminate against 
CEE trade, for example, through the 
creation of standards and regulations.59 
On the other hand, the costs of EU 
membership are so high and the poten-
                                                 
58 Based on an analysis of a panel dataset cover-
ing the period 1960–2000, Ellison and Hussain 
(2003) suggest that the rate of economic growth 
in the old cohesion countries might have been 
higher – to the tune of some 2% per annum – 
had they remained outside the EU. 
59 I am indebted here to discussions with Dan 
Marek. 
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tial gains so uncertain that membership 
may involve greater tradeoffs than these 
countries intend to make. Though these 
points are controversial, a complete ac-
counting of the potential benefits of EU 
membership must consider the potential 
for CEE politicians to resolve the dis-
crimination gap from within. 
Three components of the revised 
decision-making procedures in the Coun-
cil of Ministers (CoM) introduced with 
the Nice and the new Constitutional 
Treaty60 are important here. For one, as 
commonly noted, the 2000 Nice Summit 
– intended to complete the institutional 
reforms necessary for the enlargement – 
shifted the decision-making balance to-
ward the larger states. Amid concerns 
that a large number of new small mem-
ber states (Poland, with a population 
similar to that of Spain, and Romania 
are the only exceptions) would shift the 
balance toward the small states, the lar-
ger states pushed for a re-weighting of 
votes to ensure the center of gravity of 
the large state vote. The result – op-
posed by many of the smaller EU states 
– reduced the voting shares of smaller 
states. 
The second component of the re-
vised decision-making procedure is po-
tentially far more devastating to the in-
terests of the CEEC’s. The Nice triple ma-
jority rule requires that countries encom-
passing more than 62% of the EU popu-
lation support any given decision placed 
before the CoM.61 Though this voting 
rule must be invoked, any group of 
states encompassing 39% or more of the 
EU’s population can effectively form a 
blocking minority. This clause permits 3 
large states, or 2 large states and one 
                                                 
60 While the Constitutional Treaty has so far 
been rejected by France and the Netherlands and 
may be rejected by other states as well, it still 
provides a relevant framework for analysis on 
the possible future shape of EU institutional re-
form. 
61 The triple majority rule requires a qualified 
majority of states (QMV), a simple majority of 
voting states, and states representing 62% of the 
EU population. 
medium-sized state (for example Ger-
many, France and a country the size of 
Spain or Poland) to act as a centre of 
gravity in the New Europe (see Table 9). 
This new wrinkle in CoM voting effec-
tively preserves the blocking minority 
under the old QMV (qualified majority 
of votes) system. Under the rules estab-
lished with the Single European Act 
(1987), 3 large states, or 2 large states 
and one medium-sized state (for example 
Germany, France and a country the size 
of Spain or larger) could likewise block 
any decision before the CoM. 
The Constitutional Treaty62 hardly 
changes this fact. While QMV – in its 
current form – has been dispensed with, 
it has been replaced by a population 
rule requiring support from countries 
representing 65% of the EU population. 
The wording in the Constitutional Treaty 
requires at least 4 member states in or-
der to form a blocking minority.63 Thus 
2 large states, 1 large or medium-sized 
state (Poland or Spain would both qual-
ify) and any 4th state have the power to 
block decisions in the CoM – an impor-
tant victory for Poland and Spain.64 At 
the same time, this decision preserves the 
veto power of the large member states, 
requiring only two additional states (in-
cluding at least one large or medium-
                                                 
62 Provisional Consolidated Version of the Draft 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(June, 2004: p. 61) 
63 The Draft Constitution defines a blocking mi-
nority as including either 4 states (in most gen-
eral cases) or as including: “at least the mini-
mum number of Council members representing 
more than 35% of the population of the partici-
pating member states, plus one member…”, (my 
emphasis) Provisional Consolidated Version of the 
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (June, 2004: pp. 31, 50, 61, 127, 131, 
132, 141, etc.). 
64 Neither Spain nor Poland would have been 
able to play the same role under the first draft 
proposal of the Constitutional Treaty. While 3 
large states could have formed a blocking minor-
ity, it would not have been possible for 2 large 
states and either Poland or Spain to form a 
block minority. This, however, was possible for 
Spain and Poland under the terms of the Nice 
Treaty. Both of these states complained bitterly 
about their potential loss of voting power under 
the first draft of the Constitutional Treaty. 
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sized state) in order to act as a blocking 
minority. 
Any potential veto powers the 
CEEC’s might have had as a group un-
der the current system of weighted QMV 
will be eliminated with the introduction 
of the Constitutional Treaty. Under the 
Nice system, a blocking minority can be 
put together with states representing 90 
out of 321 votes. In an EU of 27 mem-
bers, the required number of votes 
changes to 88 out of 345. In an EU of 
25 members, the CEEC’s can form a 
coalition of 77 votes. In an EU of 27 
members, they will be able to put to-
gether a coalition of 101 votes. Thus, the 
CEEC’s will only constitute an effective 
blocking majority once Ramonaia and 
Bulgaria have joined (in 2007). Should 
the Constitutional Treaty go into effect, 
the principal tool for forming a blocking 
minority will become the population rule. 
Under the population rule and the 35% 
+ 1 state threshold, the CEEC’s will only 
make up 16% (EU25) or 22% (EU27) of 
the EU population, effectively removing 
any veto power they might have had. 
Table 9
Change in Veto Powers in Council of Ministers 
 
Country 
Pop vote 
shares in  
EU Constitu-
tion (EU27) 
Pop vote 
shares in 
EU Constitu-
tion (EU25) 
Pop vote 
shares in Nice 
Treaty (EU25)
Pop vote 
shares in Nice 
Treaty (EU15)
Weighted 
Council 
Votes EU15 
Weighted 
Council 
Votes EU12
Veto Point 35%+1 State 35%+1 State 39% 39% 26/87 23/76 
Germany 17.0% 18.1% 18.2% 21.8% 10 10 
UK 12.3% 13.1% 13.2% 15.8% 10 10 
France 12.2% 12.9% 13.0% 15.6% 10 10 
Italy 11.9% 12.7% 12.8% 15.3% 10 10 
Spain 8.2% 8.8% 8.8% 10.6% 8 8 
Netherlands 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 4.2% 5 5 
Greece 2.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.8% 5 5 
Belgium 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.7% 5 5 
Portugal 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.7% 5 5 
Sweden 1.8% 2.0% 2.0% 2.4% 4 
Austria 1.7% 1.8% 1.8% 2.2% 4 
  
  
Denmark 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.4% 3 3 
Finland 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.4% 3   
Ireland 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 3 3 
Luxembourg 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 2 2 
Poland 8.0% 8.5% 8.6% 
Romania 4.6%   
Czech Republic 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 
Hungary 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 
Bulgaria 1.7%   
Slovakia 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 
Lithuania 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
Latvia 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Slovenia 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Estonia 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Cyprus 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 
Malta 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
  
  
  
  
  
Source:  Calculated on basis of 2000 population data for the Nice and previous Treaties, and 
2003 population data for EU Constitution. Population data taken from Eurostat Long-Term Indica-
tors website. 
  
33
The third component of the revised 
decision-making rules is the introduction 
of “enhanced cooperation”, a part of the 
Treaty since Amsterdam and modified 
with the Nice and Constitutional Treaties. 
The principal change has been the re-
duction in the share of states required to 
undertake “enhanced cooperation”. The 
Amsterdam Treaty required that 50% or 
more of the Member States would have 
to agree. The Nice Treaty made it possi-
ble for a group of 8 or more states to 
engage in further policy integration 
without the participation of other EU 
Member states. While this represented 
one more than half of the Member 
States at the time of its introduction, the 
entry of 10 NMS’s (for which the Nice 
Treaty was meant to prepare the way) 8 
or more Member States would have been 
considerably less than half. With the ad-
vent of the Constitutional Treaty, only 
1/3rd of Member states are required 
(Art. III-325), making it possible for as 
few as 9 or more states to move for-
ward with further policy deepening. The 
CoM, however, retains the right to ap-
prove enhanced cooperation by unanim-
ity, making it possible for other Member 
States to slow down or stop this process. 
The ability of individual or less 
powerful states to get specific agendas 
through the CoM has traditionally de-
pended either on national vetoes and/or 
on the linkage of individual objectives 
with larger Treaty-related projects where 
unanimity voting was required. Thus, 
significant increases, for example, in the 
SCF’s were achieved along with the in-
troduction the Single European Act in 
1987 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
And France or Spain’s ability to control 
adjustments of the CAP or the SCF’s (re-
spectively) in the enlargement process has 
been strengthened by their insistence on 
the right to veto decisions that diverge 
from their interests. 
The Constitutional Treaty contains 
important features likely to affect the 
future decision-making power of these 
states. First, few national vetoes are in-
cluded and unanimity voting has been 
reduced. However, this is not true for 
the quintessential multi-annual Framework 
Agreements on the CAP and the SCF’s, 
for which unanimity has been preserved. 
Second, all future voting in the CoM is 
likely to be done on the basis of the 
new Double Majority rule (a 55% major-
ity of states – a minimum of 15 Member 
states – and the 65% population rule 
noted above). Third, enhanced coopera-
tion may free states interested in further 
policy deepening from the attempts of 
politically weaker states to extract side-
payments or other concessions. 
At least three important conclusions 
can be drawn from this analysis. First, 
the center of gravity established with 
previous Treaties may permit states such 
as Germany, France and the UK – given 
agreement on any single issue – to re-
tain control over attempts to modify the 
EU policy mix. Second, Poland and Spain 
may both have gained a place of promi-
nence in the New Europe. Both Spain 
and Poland can individually play the role 
of potential allies of the larger states 
and vote along with them on issues in 
exchange for concessions on points dear 
to either country.65 Third, the unanimity 
voting rule on multi-annual Framework 
Agreements potentially strengthens the 
CEEC’s. But the may be outweighed by 
the weakening of linkage and the relative 
power of the large OMS’s. 
As a consequence, once inside the 
EU, the CEEC’s may have little opportu-
nity to resolve the imbalance written into 
the membership contract. The center of 
gravity preserved by the population 
clause may effectively limit the power of 
the CEEC’s to pursue changes to the EU 
                                                 
65 There are already prominent examples of this 
occurring. For one, in the context of negotiations 
over the Constitutional Treaty, Poland allied with 
Spain and delayed the final agreement. For an-
other, Poland exercised its influence during the 
2000 Intergovernmental Conference in Nice (Baun 
and Marek, 2001). Spain, on the other hand, has 
long attempted to exercise considerable power 
over the distribution of SCF’s and has resisted 
giving up its “national veto” in this area. 
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policy mix not supported by the old 
large Member States. The CEEC’s are 
likely to be most effective only on issues 
that divide the larger states. The two 
policy areas that are presumably the 
most important to the CEEC’s are the 
CAP and the SCF’s. These two policy ar-
eas make up the lion’s share of the EU 
budgetary expenditures and the CEEC’s 
hope to be among the principal benefici-
aries of these policies. 
On the CAP, France and Germany 
have frequently sided with each other, 
though more recently this consensus has 
occasionally broken down. In the long 
run, France’s interest in the CAP may 
ultimately be more in line with many 
Southern states (in particular Spain, Por-
tugal and Greece), as well as some of 
the new CEEC’s (Hungary, like France is 
an important producer of cereals). Ger-
man farmers have typically not sup-
ported reforms of the CAP, but the con-
fluence of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations and CAP excesses 
may well have encouraged German in-
dustry to lobby for CAP reform. This 
constellation is likely to leave Germany 
and the UK looking for allies, but build-
ing blocking minorities may be difficult. 
The other two large countries (France 
and Italy) and the two medium-sized 
countries (Spain and Poland) will pre-
sumably favour CAP policies. Leveraging 
significant reversals of CAP policy may 
thus prove difficult. 
On the SCF’s, Germany and France 
have more traditionally been on the side 
of limiting increases in expenditure. 
Germany, as the major net contributor 
to the EU budget (along with the UK, 
the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden), 
has typically resisted increased SCF 
spending. France, not being a major re-
cipient of EU SCF’s, is more likely to side 
with Germany than with Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. However, the reuni-
fication of East and West Germany in 
1991 altered this power configuration, 
leading Germany to favour reductions in 
CAP and increases in SCF funding. In 
this regard, there are potential points of 
contact between Germany, current SCF 
recipients and the NMS’s. However, if 
the old cohesion countries lose previous 
levels of funding, they may begin to side 
with countries favouring reduced expen-
diture. In this case, the balance may 
tend to favour continued reductions. 
Failure to reach an agreement on the 
SCF’s will lead to a continuation of the 
existing regime. This greatly strengthens 
the bargaining position of the Old cohe-
sion countries.66 
Thus, unanimity voting over the 
multi-annual Framework Agreements and 
possibly the modification of the popula-
tion rule in the second draft of the Con-
stitutional Treaty may potentially favour 
the CEEC’s. But unanimity likewise en-
ables states such as Germany or Spain to 
veto decisions that do not reflect their 
interests on the SCF’s. The same is true 
with France and the CAP. Thus the 
OMS’s – and in particular the large and 
possibly the medium-sized Member States 
– may still be well positioned to act as 
a center of gravity in a Europe of 25 
(or 27) Member States. With enhanced 
cooperation and the potential loss of 
linkage, the core states may be well po-
sitioned to promote policy deepening 
without pressures from the NMS’s. This 
may suggest that the CEEC’s will be un-
able to initiate significant change in the 
near future.  
CONCLUSION 
The interests of states – and groups 
within those states – clearly drive the 
negotiation process and find clear ex-
pression in the final terms of the EU 
membership agreement. In addition, the 
                                                 
66 Article 273 of the Nice Treaty establishes that 
expenditures may be made based on the old 
expenditure regime when no decision has been 
reached. 
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relative bargaining power of states, their 
overall weight in the decision-making 
process, as well as the relative impor-
tance of the final outcomes and the po-
tential costs of exclusion – all contribute 
to the ability of states to pursue particu-
larist agendas and to guarantee eco-
nomic gains from participation in the EU. 
Bluntly put, the ability of the OMS’s to 
design and manage the process of EU 
enlargement/membership has led to a 
less than ideal outcome for the NMS’s. 
They have been obliged to accept given 
their relative lack of bargaining power, 
the degree of competition among them, 
their general fear of being excluded 
from the final agreement and the hope 
of being able to influence decision-
making from within rather than without. 
With respect to both the CAP and 
the SCF’s, at best the CEEC’s have 
emerged as marginal net winners. By 
imposing direct payments ceilings and 
quotas likely to be forced downward in 
coming years, the enlargement CAP re-
gime may effectively protect EU produc-
ers from CEE competition – at least in 
those agricultural goods regulated by the 
CAP – for the next decade. Moreover, 
while the EU generally opposes market 
distortions, it goes unnoticed that East-
West differentials in agricultural support 
lock in market distortions favouring the 
West until 2013 and possibly beyond. 
The EU Accession Treaty locks in direct 
payment ceilings and quotas for the next 
decade that are frequently well below 
Western averages. While at one point 
CEE farmers may have relished the op-
portunity to compete in Western markets 
and expand market shares, such hopes 
will likely be dashed against the firm 
protectionist rock that is the CAP. 
The impact of SCF’s policy in CEE 
is likely to be similar. An analysis of the 
distribution of EU SCF’s for the period 
2004–2006 reveals a significant discrimi-
nation gap between Eastern and Western 
Europe. Western states (in particular 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) re-
ceive far more and the CEEC’s far less 
than they should. While pouring large 
amounts of funding into CEE might 
overburden existing administrative institu-
tions (that do have difficulties distribut-
ing such funding), lead to higher rates 
of inflation, or overburden CEE budgets 
with EU co-financing requirements, such 
arguments neglect the distortionary ef-
fects of higher per capita SCF expendi-
tures in Western Europe. And little men-
tion is made in this context of the mas-
sive investments EU environmental legisla-
tion will require, or the potential benefits 
to economic restructuring that higher 
CEE transfers could bring. 
The accession process has effectively 
been structured in a way that favours 
Western interests over those of CEE. Fre-
quently, these interests are couched in 
terms that suggest the CEEC’s, by adopt-
ing Western institutions, market practices 
and engaging in trade with the West, 
will be the clear winners from the 
enlargement. Such terms disguise how-
ever ways in which Western interests are 
suffused with EU policy requirements. In 
this regard, the Association Agreements 
and the EU Accession Treaty have locked 
in an arrangement that reflects Western 
status quo interests and virtually ignores 
CEE interests. Whether this arrangement 
will generate the positive externalities 
predicted by some analysts remains un-
certain. Voting procedures in the Euro-
pean Union will likely make significant 
change favouring CEE exceedingly diffi-
cult. The introduction of the population 
rule and its likely strengthening and re-
vision in the Constitutional Treaty is 
likely to lock in a powerful status quo 
bias for years to come. 
Important theoretical and policy 
implications can be drawn from the 
above analysis. In theoretical terms, this 
analysis weakens claims that EU 
enlargement has been propelled forward 
by a sense of “community values” or the 
logic of pareto-optimality noted above. 
Second this analysis begins to resolve 
current deficiencies in intergovernmental 
interpretations of the enlargement. With 
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respect to policy implications, this analy-
sis is focused on issues likely to domi-
nate EU politics for the next decade and 
beyond. Where there are considerable 
inequalities in the treatment of NMS’s 
and where these are driven by divergent 
interests in the policies and expected 
benefits of European integration, one can 
expect important debates for years to 
come.  
The potential for the New and Old 
EU Member States to build a viable and 
stable economic and political framework 
for the 21st century will – in the long 
run – depend on their ability to manage 
the diverse interests of these many dif-
ferent states. If the EU political and eco-
nomic framework is unable to do this 
successfully, it is even possible that some 
states will withdraw from the Union – 
Article I-59 of the Provisional Consoli-
dated Version of the Draft Treaty Estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe (June, 
2004: p. 61) for the first time establishes 
this right and lays out the procedure 
states are required to follow. In this re-
spect, studies detailing factors that pro-
pel a potential divergence of interests 
within the EU framework and suggest a 
potential roadmap for a more meaning-
ful reconciliation are greatly needed. 
One potential weakness herein is 
the difficulty in explaining the final deci-
sion to join the European Union. The in-
herent logic of the above argument – 
that potential CEEC gains have been 
whittled down by the ability of OMS’s to 
structure the EU membership agreement 
in their favour – suggests there are few 
rewards for the NMS’s. The degree of 
OMS success in this regard should give 
pause even to the casual reader of stud-
ies on European integration. But ulti-
mately one is left to wonder why the 
NMS’s were willing to accept the final 
agreement. There is a strong suggestion 
here in that the perception of gain may 
exceed the direct financial rewards of 
membership. Ultimately, in addition to 
the perception of economic gain, some of 
the more intangible benefits of EU mem-
bership may mean more to individuals 
than losses resulting from CEE incorpora-
tion into the EU marketplace and legisla-
tive framework. On balance, however, 
the degree of whittling down resolutely 
predicts these issues will return to vex 
the EU of 25, 27 and beyond. 
 
* * * * * 
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